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**Editorial**

International Diplomatic Review Journal (IDRJ), Volume 1, Issue 1, 2021 is the new edition of the IDRJ which comprises of five well selected articles which covers a wide range of issues including: national and international security, international relations, conflicts resolution and international trade. Authors have managed to critically analyse and provide insights which do not only contribute to the body of knowledge but also provide practical options to tackling various real-life situations within and across nations. Although each of the five articles stands dependably on its own merits, we have made an attempt to impose a rough thematic structure and logical flow in their ordering, motivated by an interest in emphasizing some of the methodological similarities and differences.

In the first article on Global Perspective of Transnational Crimes and National Security, the author tried to link technological advancement and upsurge in transnational crimes. The study analyses the impacts of transnational crimes on national security and concludes that transnational crime is a global security threat that calls for regional multijurisdictional taskforces and joint operations. The second article, European Union's Externalization for Migration Control Strategy through its Emergency Trust Fund for Africa discusses the Valetta European Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa as one of the European Union (EU) externalization migration control strategies. The study revealed the criticisms directed towards the initiative including the EU's hastiness prompted by its quick-fix mentality, the political agenda revolving around the EUTF projects and programmes which are against the norms of official development aid mechanisms as well as lack of Africa's ownership of such projects. The author urges that despite the immediate benefits likely to be reaped by African countries from the EU's financial support, it is imperative to analyze the long-term consequences of the initiative in order to avoid further devastation to these struggling nations.

In the third article on Influence of Foreign Aid on Elections Management and Administration in Tanzania, 1995-2010, the author assessed the impact of foreign aids on the general election on of 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. The study revealed that the extent of donors' encroachment on election management and administration depended on the magnitude of foreign aid received by

elections management bodies (EMBs). Hence, it is recommended that, management and administration of elections ought be controlled by the EMBs. Further, in the fourth article on The Role of SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) in Ensuring Market Availability for Tanzania’s Products, the author analyses the competitiveness of Tanzanian products in the SADC market. The results affirm that Tanzania enjoys a sound comparative advantage over its trading partners on several products. It is urged that deliberate measures ought to be taken to promote local technology by improving infant industries, and there is a need to ensure financial sector accessibility which provides friendly financial assistance to traders. Finally, the fifth article on The Traditional Methods of Conflict Transformation in Africa: The Case of Gacaca Courts in Rwanda provides the historical facts on post - genocide conflict transformation in Rwanda. The study describes traditional ways employed by the Gacaca court in Rwanda. The article concludes that the traditional methods of conflict transformation help to build sustainable peace in the society.

The IDRJ editorial management hopes the readers of this journal will find this new edition to be an informative and useful collection of articles and thus spread the news about its existence to the wider global community. Finally, we welcome submissions of articles for the forthcoming issues of this journal.

Ambassador Dr. Abdulrahman O. J. Kaniki. Ndc  
Chief Editor

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**A Global Perspective of Transnational Crimes and National Security**

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**Abstract**

*In the wake of globalisation and technological advancement, the world has experienced a very rapid increase both in levels and the sophistication of transnational crimes thereby posing security threats to nation states. The world has witnessed illegal activities being carried out without respecting national boundaries or sovereignty. Thus, this study sought to analyse transnational crimes in relation to national security and impacts brought by such kinds of crimes. Challenges that face law enforcement agencies when fighting the transnational crimes are also looked at. The paper concludes that transnational crimes are a security threat to the globe. The study recommends paying more attention to border security, working multidisciplinary through bringing onboard all stakeholders and strengthening public-private-partnerships, soliciting technical assistance, strengthening global peace and security initiatives and the need for regional multijurisdictional taskforces and joint operations.*

**Keywords:** *borders, crime, criminal groups, national security, security threats*

**1.0 Introduction**

This paper analyses transnational crimes in relation to national security focusing on a global perspective. The analysis stems out from the reality that the phenomenon of transnational crimes needs to be discussed both as a crime and as a national security issue. This is because its impacts pose threats to domestic and international security of state nations. Security is one of the prerequisites for sustainable economic development. It should therefore, be well thought despite its

continued intensity and complexity.<sup>1</sup> Among the many threats on economic development globally are transnational crimes. This paper surveys the threats posed by transnational crimes globally.

## **2.0 Methodology**

This study was conducted through involving library research and literature survey. It was a desk-based research work, which reviewed various sources related to the study. the research involved a review and assessment of various documentary sources containing secondary information related to transnational crime and national security. Those sources included monographs, peer - reviewed journals and other forms of reviews, official reports and documents, text books and international legal instruments.

## **3.0 Findings and Discussion**

### **3.1 The concept of transnational crime in an historical perspective**

Globally, transnational crime has recently featured more prominently and its impacts are felt through wrecking of the world economies and diverse threats on security systems. After the end of Cold War II, the world has experienced a very rapid increase both in levels and the sophistication of transnational crime. Generally, every country has experienced this kind of crime to a certain degree because no country, worldwide can consider itself immune to transnational crime. A number of organised criminal groups have continued to emerge and expand their activities across national frontiers, a situation which signifies that crime today has assumed an internationalized character. However, the nature, form and pattern of crime have drastically changed from traditional to new forms that are transnational.

The definition of transnational crime as Finckenauer (2005) argues is of great importance because *how* the problem of organised crime is defined is significant in determining how laws are formed, how investigations and prosecutions are conducted, how research studies are done, and, increasingly, how mutual assistance across national borders is or is not rendered.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Mukungu, G.J. (2014). *The Analysis of Data Mining to Prevent Crimes in Tanzania*, Unpublished PhD Thesis. Department of Business Administration, Graduate School of Soongsil University, Seoul, South Korea, p.1.

<sup>2</sup> Finckenauer, J. 2005. "Problems of Definition: What is Organised Crime?," *Trends in Organised Crime*, Vol.8, No.3, Spring: 63-83, at 68.

The concept of ‘transnational crime’ originates from the *1975 Report of the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders*, in Geneva, when the United Nations used the term in order to identify certain criminal activities which transcend national jurisdictions. Such activities include organised crime, corruption and offences involving works of art and other cultural property.<sup>3</sup> However, the interest in transnational crime among scholars and policy makers did not intensify until the 1990s, during the time of significant political and economic development, as the Soviet Union dramatically collapsed.<sup>4</sup> Initially, little consensus was found on what constitutes transnational crime and how it should be defined. Due to the conflicting views, efforts were made during the *1994 Fourth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems* to create a more precise conception. This early attempt to assess the prevalence of transnational crime was loaded with difficulties. The survey results showed that two states were unable to respond because no distinction was made in their criminal justice system, between national or transnational crime and almost all 193 responding countries encountered some form of classification problems.<sup>5</sup> However, for the purpose of the survey transnational crime was defined as offences whose inception, prevention and/or direct or indirect effects involved more than one country<sup>6</sup>.

It is said that in 1994 the United Nations made an effort to clarify the concept of transnational crime by establishing 18 categories.<sup>7</sup> These are: money laundering, terrorist activities, theft of art and cultural objects, theft of intellectual property, illicit traffic in arms, aircraft hijacking, sea piracy, hijacking on land, insurance fraud, computer crime, environmental crime, trafficking in persons, trade in human body parts, illicit drug trafficking, fraudulent bankruptcy, infiltration of legal business, corruption and bribery of public officials, and finally other offences committed by organised criminal groups.

According to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 2000, an offence is transnational if, firstly, it is committed in more than one state, secondly, it is committed

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<sup>3</sup> UN Doc. A.CONF. 169/15/Add.1 (1995).

<sup>4</sup> Reichel, P. (2005). *Handbook of Transnational Crime & Justice*. London: Sage Publications, p.3.

<sup>5</sup> Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, A.CONF. 169/15/Add, (April 1995) p. 5, paragraph 13.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, at p. 4, paragraph 9.

<sup>7</sup> Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, A.CONF. 169/15/Add, p. 9. 1, 4 April 1995.

in one state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction, or control takes place in another state, thirdly, it is committed in one state but involves an organised criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state, and finally, it is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state. The more recently agreed international definitions of transnational crime have continued to emphasise as its distinguishing characteristics, the notion that it involves cross - border criminal activity, and violating the laws of more than one country. It is from this approach that Senior (2010) adopts the definition of transnational crime as quoted below:

The concept of transnational crime, used for the purpose of this thesis, will follow the simple notion that, it is a crime that involves cross -border criminal activity, which violates the laws of more than one state. The definition from the Palermo Convention clarifies this as including the commission, preparation, planning, direction or effects of the crime occurring in more than one state. This definition of transnational crime covers a lot of criminal activity ranging from smuggling of illicit drugs to electronic crime, it is almost impossible to create a catch - all list due to its evolving nature. This paper distinguishes international crimes from transnational criminal activities on the basis that the former are egregious crimes prohibited by international law, including treaties and customs, whereas transnational crimes are those acts occurring in, or affecting more than one state, and which are criminalised by the domestic laws of more than one state.<sup>8</sup>

The fact that a variety of criminal conduct features an extra-territorial moment explains why: *Penal actions are in many instances no longer confined to one state's territory, but rather involve different jurisdictions and trigger a transnational enforcement of criminal law.*<sup>9</sup>

In view of the historical conceptual definitions above, theoretically and practically there are framework conditions through which transnational crimes operate. Researchers have developed a more general framework that defines the conditions necessary for the transnational crime to thrive and become entrenched in any given jurisdiction. Among them is Sheptycki (2012)<sup>10</sup> who derives from Varese's account on the general theoretical framework that defines conditions such as of "how

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<sup>8</sup> Senior, A. (2010). *Organised Crime: Combating an Elusive Transnational Threat*. Unpublished Masters of Laws Thesis. The University of Waikato, New Zealand, p.9.

<sup>9</sup> Gless, S. (2011). *General Principles of Transnational Criminal Law – A European Perspective on the Principle of Legal Certainty*, A paper Presented at the Globalisation of Crime: Criminal Justice Responses Conference August 7-11, Ottawa, Canada, at p.1.

<sup>10</sup> Sheptycki, J. (2012). "Transnational Organised Crime," in Leuprecht, C., Hotaley, T. and Richard, K. (Eds.), *Evolving Transnational Threats and Border Security: A New Research Agenda*, Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University Kingston, Ontario, Canada, pp.65-70.

Mafias move”.<sup>11</sup> Sheptycki further comes up with four useful conditions. According to him, those conditions include: first the population of motivated offenders. That is people who have the skills, knowledge and worldview necessary to undertake seriously organised criminal activities. The second condition is the existence of illicit markets in which there must be a reasonably significant demand for products among the general population for products and services that cannot be obtained legally in order for an organized crime to thrive economically. Thirdly is the state-government’s weakness or inability to provide accessible and efficient dispute resolutions. This is partly related to the existence of illicit markets whereby informal dispute resolutions can lead to ongoing violence. Fourthly, lack of social trust and low levels of civic engagement create fertile grounds for organisation of crimes.<sup>12</sup>

### **3.2 Transnational crime and national security**

Transnational crimes pose actual and potential threats to the national security. All nations are vulnerable to this cross-border menace. The *United States President’s Office* acknowledges as quoted:

Transnational organized crime (TOC) poses a significant and growing threat to national and international security, with dire implications for public safety, public health, democratic institutions, and economic stability across the globe. Not only are criminal networks expanding, but they also are diversifying their activities, resulting in the convergence of threats that were once distinct and today have explosive and destabilizing effects.<sup>13</sup>

Deducing from the quotation above transnational crime endangers national security due to the fact that it is committed by people who operate in a number of nation-states through what appears like a process of transmitting or replicating them beyond national borders with the effect of threatening

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<sup>11</sup> Varese, F. (2010). *Mafias on the Move: How Organised Crime Conquers New Territory*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press,.

<sup>12</sup> Sheptycki, *op cit*, pp.66-67.

<sup>13</sup> The US President’s Office, (2011). *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organised Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security*. Washington: The White House, July, p.5.

national security.<sup>14</sup> It should therefore be underscored that transnational crime constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the nations.

National security is traditionally perceived as a function of the nation-state's ability to preserve the core values of its society, its territorial integrity and the physical safety of its citizens. The term 'national security' became acceptable and widely used after World War II, especially among the Western Allies, led by the United States.<sup>15</sup> In the context of threats to security, it was always considered mostly as threats from external sources arising from the many rising territorial and politico-ideological conflicts of the Cold War.<sup>16</sup> By this understanding, the responsibility to protect citizens is vested in the state and that the state demands their loyalty. It is from this line of argument that Harold Brown, the U.S. Secretary of Defence from 1977 to 1981 in the Carter administration, expanded the definition of national security by including elements such as economic and environmental security as stated below::

National security then is the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders.<sup>17</sup>

The concept emanates from military and political cohesion, that is to say safeguarding or maintaining national or state sovereignty, which was the most basic foundation of national security during the Cold War era. It was an era where nuclear or ideological threats sounded in high tones. This state of affairs is well summed up by Castle (1997) who states as follows:

In the past half-century, the most common (and given the state-to-state contest of the Cold War, the most logical) definition in everyday usage was that of national security. That is, security was measured as a function of the nation-state's ability to preserve the core values of its society, its territorial integrity and the physical safety

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<sup>14</sup> Pobre, C.P. (2013). "Trends in Security Thought," *National Security Review*, The Study of National Security at 50: Re-awakening, A Golden Anniversary Publication of the National Defence College of the Philippines, pp.11-39, p.26.

<sup>15</sup> Lopez, G.M.J.,(2013). "Integrating National Security into Philippine Regional Development Planning," *National Security Review*, *op cit*, pp.40-68, p.44.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> Brown, H. (1983). *Thinking about National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World*, as quoted in Watson, C.A., *U.S. National Security: A Reference Handbook*, Contemporary World Issues, New York, 2008, at p. 281.

of its citizens – at least as much as those characteristics were defined by the ruling elite.<sup>18</sup>

In the course of doing so, the state was traditionally expected to protect its internal values from external threats. The main focus was thus on protecting the nation-state against external aggressors.

However, the end of Cold War caused a paradigm shift. New problems emerged and created new insecurities in place of nuclear and ideological threats. So far the principal threats of the Cold War have largely disappeared, but new threats in new forms have taken place. The post Cold War era has witnessed new threats that are nontraditional and are no longer only military. For instance, it is argued that issues not typically associated with security in the cold war context were ‘securitised’, as security expanded from military danger to a broader sense of survival across a number of dimensions.<sup>19</sup> As such, those issues that were basically rated as non-traditional threats to security have recently emerged as important in security studies agenda. One among them is transnational crime. It is argued by Iglesias (2011) that:

After the end of the Cold War and as a consequence of globalization, threats have no longer a pure character extending the concept of security. Global problems, the majority of which are cross-border, like organised crime, terrorism, deterioration of the environment, disputes over natural resources, uncontrolled refugee flows, illegal immigration, poverty and famine have become risks for humanity which seem as important as the traditional military defence. Therefore, some believe that it is necessary to extend the concept of security in multiple sectors and at different levels, and that territoriality and military defence are not the only main concepts.<sup>20</sup>

In view of the above transnational character, crime has been remarked upon and identified as a worrying trend, posing threats to states, national economies and civil societies. For example, non-state actors can use terrorism not only to promote their political causes, “...nationalist-separatism or religious fanaticism, [but also] terrorists of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are likely to be more determined than ever to cause massive destruction and human carnage to advance their particular causes.”<sup>21</sup> These groupings gain strength from their ability to forge linkages across national boundaries. Their activities represent a challenge to the national sovereignty and integrity of independent states and

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<sup>18</sup> Castle, A. (1997). *Transnational Organized Crime and International Security*, Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia, Working Paper, No. 19, November, p.7.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p.1.

<sup>20</sup> Iglesias, M.A.L. (2011). *The Evolution of the Concept of Security*, Framework Document 05/2011, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, Madrid, June, pp.2-3.

<sup>21</sup> Smith, P.J.(2000). “Transnational Security Threat and State Survival: A Role for the Military?” *Parameters, U.S Army War College Quarterly*, Autumn, pp.77-91, p.80.

threaten the survival of governments. A good example is an Islamist terrorist group *Boko Haram* in Nigeria. It is manifestly a fact that the group destabilises socio-economic and political activities in the country thereby posing serious threats to the national security.

Other forms of transnational crimes affect states and their societies in general. Illicit trade, drug trafficking and money laundering reduce governments' capacity to govern, weaken the credibility of financial institutions and undermine social order of nations. Weak states and open societies are especially vulnerable to transnational crimes.<sup>22</sup> Shelley (1995) states that:

Transnational organised crime has been a serious problem for most of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, but it has only recently been recognized as a threat to the world order. This criminality undermines the integrity of individual countries, but is not yet a threat to the nation-states. Failure to develop viable, coordinated international policies in the face of ever-growing transnational criminality, however, may undermine the nation-states in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.<sup>23</sup>

It follows from this quotation that transnational crime should not be underestimated because it has very devastating effects to the nation-states' security if early warning measures are not taken seriously and effectively. Transnational crimes have various impacts on the globe.

### **3.3 Economic impacts of transnational crimes**

Nation states experience severe economic impacts of transnational crimes. Just to highlight a few indicators, the proliferation of counterfeit products throughout the nations is a clear manifestation that the nations' revenues are affected. Moreover, the increasing of money laundering activities which destabilise the economy is a clear manifestation that the countries' economies are greatly affected. On the other hand, an increasing number of drug traffickers and abusers in countries globally deny the countries of energetic manpower which would be engaged in legitimate economic undertakings. All in all, it should be noted that transnational crime is a barrier to prospected local and foreign investors and international trade in general.

The increasingly emerging transnational crime is posing security threats in many parts of the globe. For example, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons [SALWs] especially in and around regions bordering war - torn and conflict - stricken neighboring countries put the world at insecurity

<sup>22</sup> Emmers, R. (2002). *The Securitization of Transnational Crime in ASEAN*, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, Working Paper Series No.39, November, p.2.

<sup>23</sup> Shelly. (1995). "Transnational Organised Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State?" *Journal of International Affairs*, 48:2 Winter, p. 463.

angles. Such state of affairs creates fear to the citizens on their security and of their property. Normally, where there is penetration of illegal firearms, people do feel insecure due to increased aggravated armed robberies and threats of terrorist attacks. Also, the more criminals crisscross the borders, the more the increase of organised criminal syndicates, hence increase in crime rates. This may resultantly ruin the good image of affected countries in an unsecured arena, thus become unsafe places to live in and scare local and foreign investors.

At critical level, transnational crime curtails social welfare of the communities. The fact that at times the governments are denied of their revenues due to criminal activities involved, there is a deterioration of social welfare provision. Impacts of transnational crime are felt at state and regime security levels in particular on governance and rule of law domain. The fact that malpractices are involved in facilitating the commission of cross-border offences such as corruption, it is obvious that it interferes with tenets of good governance and the rule of law. Moreover, transnational crime has impacts on the area of human rights. Crimes such as human trafficking are a violation of human rights. All in all, the governments are forced to allocate hefty budgets in crime detection and prevention instead of development activities.

Diplomatically, transnational crime impacts on nations' relations. Where transnational crime is unmanageable, it affects the diplomatic relations between neighboring countries. And at critical level diplomatic relations statements may be experienced. Under such situations, the countries' efforts to achieve economic diplomacy may not be realized to the fullest.

### **3.4 Implications, challenges, and opportunities: The future outlook**

Transnational crime is a current global concern in international cooperation discussions. International initiatives that aim at combating this type of crime are taken worldwide. The main concern is to explore opportunities, challenges and prospects for the safer and more secure future world. Transnational criminal networks are so organised such that no single nation can fight against them single handedly. Even the supposedly world superpowers such as the United States appreciate this reality. Substantiating this argument, Driscoll (2014) elaborates:

International criminal groups and networks are not constrained by the borders to which states limit the extension of the use of force, jurisdiction, or legislative authority. Prosecutors combating an international criminal group must regularly work in and with several different countries to build a single case. The criminal law enforcement institutions in the United States, however, are not historically designed for this; they have been constructed with the explicit goal of operating within their

national boundaries. Therefore, a shift in strategy is required away from U.S. federal and unilateral efforts towards international and multilateral initiatives to combat TOC.<sup>24</sup>

Therefore, the involvement of multinational cooperation in law enforcement among various agencies world over is inevitable. The inevitability thereof buttresses itself from the reality that it is through cooperation among countries that exchange of information can be effected, and above all capacity-building, mutual legal assistance as well as joint investigations can be undertaken. Given the complexities of transnational crimes, no country can stand alone and fight effectively such kind of crimes. This explains why international police cooperation is very important in these days to collaborate in dealing with transnational issues such as these crimes. Despite the fact that international cooperation is inevitable in combating transnational crimes globally, there are many challenges, opportunities and prospects in that regard. Police forces in all nations should rely more and more on cooperation. Driscoll (2014) further emphasized the rationale for cooperation among nations:

It is fundamentally incorrect to think that any single state can productively combat TOC, regardless of its strength and resources. Moreover, it is often impossible to identify, capture, and prosecute international offenders without the active assistance of foreign governments. This is especially hard to accomplish in a context of lacking multilateral legislation and cooperation, as national laws vary greatly on the treatment of organized criminal groups and drug traffickers specifically.....Sensitive issues of sovereignty, state monopoly of the use of force domestically, and legal jurisdiction perpetually complicate such cooperation.<sup>25</sup>

Deducing from the excerpt, what is needed is better coordination, optimal use of resources and constantly learning from one another.

Therefore, international cooperation should enable member states to conduct joint trainings and regular meetings so as to strategise on how to address the transnational crimes. This would enable effective exchange of intelligence, information and evidence as well as carry out joint intelligence-led operations to combat, disrupt and defeat criminal enterprises at global level. It should as well enable the strengthening of the state capacity to fight against transnational crimes through technical assistance.

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<sup>24</sup> Driscoll, J. (2014). "Improving U.S. Strategy on Transnational Organized Crime," *International Affairs Review*, Volume XXIII, Number 1, Fall, pp.84-103, 96.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p.89.

The United Nations, which has the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, is one of the important avenues through which the international cooperation in prevention and combating of transnationally organised crimes can be realised. It is through this mandate that the UN came up with the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime signed in Palermo, Italy, in December 2000. The signing of this instrument was a major step towards global cooperation to fight international crimes. The signing of this convention was a clear manifestation that the international community was determined to address the transnational organised crimes global challenge with a global response, as so argued by Kofi A. Annan, the former UN Secretary-General:

Criminal groups have wasted no time in embracing today's globalised economy and the sophisticated technology that goes with it. But our efforts to combat them have remained up to now very fragmented and our weapons almost obsolete. The Convention gives us a new tool to address the scourge of crime as a global problem. With enhanced international cooperation, we can have a real impact on the ability of international criminals to operate successfully and can help citizens everywhere in their often bitter struggle for safety and dignity in their homes and communities.<sup>26</sup>

The purpose of this Convention is to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organised crimes more effectively. The Convention and the protocols thereto are the main tools available to the international community to fight against transnational organised crime.<sup>27</sup> The Convention encourages cooperation among states to assist each other in obstructing the activities of criminal nature, and improving international cooperation in investigation, apprehension and prosecution of suspects. Under the Convention, each State Party is urged to take necessary measures to implement the Convention, including legislative and administrative measures in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic laws, to ensure the implementation of its obligations under the Convention.

Another avenue is Interpol, which is the International Criminal Police Organisation [ICPO], created in 1923 to further cross-border cooperation when it came to solving crimes. Interpol provides a centralised source of assistance and information.<sup>28</sup> The organisation operates globally by helping to

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<sup>26</sup> See Foreword to the Convention at p. iv.

<sup>27</sup> Those protocols, which supplement the Convention, are Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air and Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their parts and Components and Ammunition.

<sup>28</sup> The Interpol has four core functions:

prevent people from committing crimes in one country and using international borders as a barrier to prevent prosecution. It allows foreign enforcement authorities to work together. This is well emphasized by the former Secretary General of the Organisation, Andre Bossard who remarks:

...If we are to envisage world-wide international co-operation, we must make provision for co-operation between countries with most widely differing constitutions and political systems, and ensure that co-operation can be maintained in spite of any divergences that may exist between countries at any given point in time.<sup>29</sup>

Most countries in the world are members of Interpol.<sup>30</sup> Tanzania is a member since 19<sup>th</sup> September, 1962. These and other avenues offer opportunities for states to cooperate in fighting against various transnational crimes. The major question is to what extent member states use these avenues effectively?

Although there are positive moves in international law enforcement cooperation, there still remain several pitfalls including:

- a. The scope of international cooperation is currently limited by international agreements and the national law of the state from which information is requested.
- b. There are differing priorities between developed and developing countries. Such differences complicate international cooperation and expand the gap between the two groups.
- c. Addressing such aspects as cyber crime brings a global concern to both developing and developed countries. It poses problems including limited availability of specialised computer crime units; possible lack of powers to investigate the content of a computer system against the will of the right holder; encryption policies; and verification of authenticity of evidence.

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- a. To provide global police communications service. This enables policing authorities from member countries to request and submit information. As a result, policing authorities have an efficient way to share and access information;
  - b. To maintain and update databases that can be accessed and used by international policing authorities. These databases contain information including notices of wanted individuals, alerts of stolen documents, and counterfeiting trends;
  - c. To provide support in emergency situations or with regard to crimes that the organisation has identified as priority; and
  - d. To help member countries build and improve upon their policing capabilities. Training programmes are often offered to strengthen or educate enforcement agencies on certain issues.

<sup>29</sup> Bossard, A. (1980). "Police Co-operation in Europe," *International Criminal Police Review*, December, No. 343, pp. 282-289, at p.285.

<sup>30</sup> It has 194 members worldwide.

- d. The fact that nation states jealously safeguard their jurisdictions<sup>31</sup> over criminal justice matters has produced a world where criminal justice policies, institutions, procedures and laws vary widely and deeply among many countries of the world. Sadly, this has eventually been a snag to effective repression of transnational crimes.
- e. Effective international responses are affected by insufficient cooperation among states; weak coordination among international agencies; and inadequate compliance by many states.
- f. Criminal organizations constrain the regional integration and interdependence of national economies to operate on an international scale and transform their operations into diversified legitimate economic activities.

Despite the above outlined challenges, there are a number of opportunities that maybe used effectively to enhance cooperation at international level. These opportunities include the following:

- a. *Mutual legal assistance*: The UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 2000 and its three protocols namely, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their parts, Components and Ammunition provide guidelines for mutual legal assistance between state parties, law enforcement cooperation and the collection, analysis and exchange of information on the nature of organised crime activities. It now remains for state parties to make arrangements on how best they should make use of these readily available opportunities to render legal assistance to each other in a mutual understanding.
- b. *Police cooperation across borders*: Effective police cooperation across borders involves sharing of intelligence, coordinating operations, securing evidence and targeting suspects.<sup>32</sup> To realise all these at international level, it is inevitable that countries make use of Interpol available services such as the Interpol communication system that is I-24/7. This is an

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<sup>31</sup> The dual notions of national sovereignty and exclusive state jurisdiction over criminal law matters, which continue to be supported by the United Nations Charter and by international law in general, still feature prominently in the development of modern criminal justice systems, whereas national borders are becoming increasingly obsolete and irrelevant to criminal activities.

<sup>32</sup> Le, V., *et al.* (2013). "Elements of Best Practice in Policing Transnational Organised Crime: Critical Success Factors for International Cooperation," *International Journal of Management and Administrative Sciences (IJMAS)*, Vol.2, No.3, Feb, 24-34, 25.

abundant opportunity for member states to enhance or establish regional databases, which are of fundamental importance in fighting against transnational crimes.

- c. *Enhancing capacities and capabilities*: Understandably, transnational crime groups operate largely in network structures and police are more likely to be successful in containing transnational crimes if they can operate with the same level of flexibility and adaptability.<sup>33</sup> Concentration should be directed to developing police forces and services with the requisite capacity to detect and investigate crimes. Law enforcement agencies from developed countries stand a better chance in assisting police forces or services in developing countries to improve and strengthen the capacity of police where expertise and training are known to be poor. As Vy Le., *et al* (2013) note, this will ensure that cooperative policing efforts produce the most effective outcomes for joint investigations.<sup>34</sup> Otherwise the police forces and services in developing countries may be turned into soft targets by the transnational crime groups thereby rendering all efforts by the law enforcement agencies from developed countries, which are said to be well equipped fruitless. Lest be forgotten that criminals exploit the weaknesses in laws and law enforcement capacity to execute their crimes.<sup>35</sup>
- d. *Global public-private-partnership*: One of the concerns is to consider information technology [IT] as an effective means in preventing and combating transnational crimes at a global level. It must be understood that transnational criminals use the same information technology to plan and realise their activities. This has been possible because they have the ability to identify and make use of security holes in the system very effectively and at many times unidentified. It is high time for law enforcement agencies to forge functional partnerships with both public and private system proprietors and administrators in order to seal such security holes.

So far it cannot be denied that the implications of transnational crimes are very serious domestically, regionally and internationally. The fact that they pose national and international security threats complicates the matter when dealing with them. This implies that sustainable and concerted efforts should continually be taken otherwise if not tackled they can wreck the world. In view of these

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<sup>33</sup> Godson, R. and Williams, P. (2001). "Strengthening Cooperation against Transnational Crime: A New Security Imperative," in Vlassis, D. and Williams, P. (Eds.), *Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses*, Frank Cass Publishers, Oxfordshire, pp.321-355.

<sup>34</sup> Le, V., *et al.*, *op cit.*, p.27.

<sup>35</sup> Shelley, L. (2003). "Organised Crime, Terrorism and Cybercrime," Byden, A. and Fluri, P. (Eds.), *Security Sector Reform: Institutions, Society and Good Governance*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, pp. 303-312, p. 309.

arguments, future prospects on addressing transnational crimes globally rest much on the opportunities that are available under the auspices of international cooperation. The success of policing in the digital age will be determined not by how well their members understand technology, but by how well they capitalise the opportunities it creates and their willingness to engage the community. To do this effectively they need to lower their flags and engage the community more constructively.

Moreover, given the trends of transnational crime worldwide, the future world sees the need for effective seizure and utilisation of opportunities that will address transnational organised crimes. This requires the enhancement of international cooperation through law enforcement agencies in the following activities:

- a. improving the implementation of existing relevant conventions, protocols and harmonising the existing legislations;
- b. continuing to promote the conduct of joint international investigations;
- c. establishing memoranda of understanding with non-law enforcement agencies to avoid losing the relationship due to changes of personnel;
- d. continuing to integrate efforts by regional and international organisations with the work of the UN;
- e. improving international relationships in order to structure effective intervention and public awareness; and
- f. exchanging best practices among regions.<sup>36</sup>

#### **4.0 Conclusions**

In conclusion, it can be argued that transnational crimes are really an increasing threat to the national security of many countries in the globe. Transnational crimes are no longer considered as a problem of criminality alone, but also a phenomenon operating on a wide scale to the extent of harming the overall functioning of societies and politics worldwide.

The rapid internationalisation of crimes is a challenge for law enforcement in the whole world. Transnational criminal syndicates are becoming more and more powerful and universal, and their mobility is growing. They are nowadays adaptable, sophisticated, extremely opportunistic and

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<sup>36</sup> We acknowledge to have mainly taken these activities *mutatis mutandis* from Pakes, F., *et al.*, *ibid.*, p.59.

immersed in a full range of illegal and legal activities around the globe. It has been possible for them to do so because they learn, adapt and take advantage of changes that occur in the societies, be it in improved information and communication technologies or the opening up of financial markets. Admittedly, transnational crime activities weaken economies and financial systems and they undermine the workings of the free market economy. Due to their illegal activities, transnational crime groups have access to huge amounts of money, which needs to be “washed.” This large-scale money laundering has an impact on the operations of legitimate financial institutions which, in the long run, can go beyond the business sector with negative effects on the investment climate, tax revenues and consumers’ confidence. In undertaking their illegal activities, transnational criminal activities threaten the states’ socio-economic and political well-being. They therefore upset the peace and security of nations worldwide. Now that transnational crimes feature more prominently in the country thereby threatening the security of nation states, the task ahead is how these types of crimes can be addressed effectively. It is clear that the cooperation is facing a number of challenges, some of which are outlined in this paper. What remains is how to turn those challenges into opportunities.

Efforts therefore, need to be made to address the transnational crimes. These efforts should, however, take into consideration the dynamic nature of the crimes, among others. Noting from the discussion above, international efforts have an instrumental role to play towards preventing and combating transnational crimes. Such efforts will pave a way for effective addressing of the vice. International cooperation is unavoidable because no single nation can stop the daunting flow of transnational crimes around the globe.

## **5.0 Recommendations**

Basing on what has been discussed in this study, the following recommendations are made:

### **5.1 Focus on border security**

Border security is a tool to combat transnational crime threats. Nation states should strengthen their border security by adequately engaging all law enforcement agencies which have stakes in border security. The agencies should create meaningful linkages and improve information sharing that could enable them to respond rapidly to the transnational crime threats. In addition, a thorough situational analysis should be conducted in order to appropriately allocate available resources. It is

of paramount importance to improve capacity and capability at the borders so that transnational criminal activities are prevented and combated.

## **5.2 Working multi-disciplinarily through bringing on board all stakeholders and strengthening of public-private partnership**

Times of working single-handedly are over. The trend now is that police world over need to work multi-disciplinarily at every level. And before taking action, they must liaise with national and international partners. Since police are not jacks-of-all-trades, they must cooperate with all stakeholders in a globalised environment in order to achieve their goals. Transnational criminal activities touch every section of the global population. Equally importantly, fighting this kind of activities requires combined efforts of all stakeholders. No single entity can tackle transnational criminal problems on its own. Basing on this line of argument, all players at all levels should be taken on board.

## **5.3 Need for technical assistance**

The fact that transnational crime challenges tend to be more frightening and alarming for many nation states, technical assistance is highly needed. Such assistance would enhance and strengthen their capacity to prevent, combat and prosecute transnational crime cases. Thus an effective use of national, regional and international opportunities is of great importance.

## **5.4 Strengthening global peace and security initiatives**

Much as transnational crime is now emerging as a serious threat to national and international security and stability, global peace and security initiatives should be enhanced and strengthened so that the world becomes a safer place to live in.

## **5.5 Need for regional multijurisdictional taskforces and joint operations**

By seizing opportunities in terms of regional and international cooperation, nation states should forge and encourage establishment of multijurisdictional taskforces within their geographical locations in order to combine intelligence and investigative resources from several law enforcement agencies. In order to make this a reality, periodical intelligence-led joint anti-crime operations should be carried out.

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**Aid and Migration: European Union’s Externalization for Migration Control Strategy through its Emergency Trust Fund for Africa**

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**Abstract**

*This paper discusses the Valetta European Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa as one of the European Union (EU) externalization migration control strategies. By using a case study approach and thematic analysis, this paper analyzes the execution of this strategy, the ongoing projects under it and, ultimately, it analyzes how Europe’s defensive posturing and extra-territorialisation will reshape its relationship with Africa and Africa’s stability in general. The findings unveiled the criticisms directed towards the initiative including the EU’s hastiness prompted by its quick-fix mentality, the political agenda revolving the EUTF projects and programmes which are against the norms of official development aid mechanisms as well as lack of Africa’s ownership of such projects. Despite the immediate benefits likely to be reaped by African countries from the EU’s financial support, this paper recommends that long term consequences of the initiative should be analyzed imperatively to avoid further devastation to these struggling nations.*

**Keywords:** externalization, migration, Official Development Assistance (ODA) , trust fund

**1.0 Introduction**

European migration crises began in 2015 (BBC, 2016) and in that year alone the EU had 1,015,078 immigrants arriving by sea as asylum seekers and others, compared to just about 220,000 the year before (only about 75,000 in the first half of 2014) (UNHCR, 2016). The European statistical

agency (Eurostat, 2016) reported that in the year 2015 the EU received over 1.2 million new asylum applications which is over 100% higher than the previous year. Germany, Austria, Sweden and Hungary received almost two-thirds of those (Eurostat, 2016) while 3,771 people were reported dead or missing in the waters separating Europe from Asia and Africa (UNHCR, 2015). The European migration crisis has brought space and geopolitics back into the political discourses and agenda of the European Union (EU) and its member states (Nitoiu & Sus, 2019).

The massive arrival of asylum seekers in Europe is not something new. Migration in and outside Europe has taken different shapes throughout history. In fact, immobility has never been the normal condition of people before the modern era. Migration is as old as humankind itself. The earliest migrants are believed to be ancient humans who originated from Africa spreading to Eurasia. The “Out of Africa” theory posits that *Homo sapiens* dispersed across Eurasia around 60,000 years ago, but this has been challenged by the evidence of migrations from Africa to Eurasia about 120,000 years ago (Blakemore, 2019) revealing that human migration existed way before those years.

The current human flow into Europe, however, is different from historic migration. The most obvious difference is that most refugees are from culturally distinct countries such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and North Africa. The current rush of refugees to Europe has thus caused considerable domestic as well as diplomatic turmoil and some unprecedented events carry with them political and economic repercussions that are shaking the European countries to their constitutional foundations.

There are risks and benefits of migration; such has prompted European countries to desire different responses to migration crisis. One of the main arguments for migration is the demographic decline of Europe. As life expectancy rate increases the fertility rate declines, meaning that most European populations are aging and shrinking in size. This decline will eventually reap to a decline in workforce which in turn will create a number of financial issues for the European governments as they will be forced to spend more and more in pensions and health care.

Some analysts argue that immigration is the best solution to ease demographic decline. For instance, having the lowest fertility rate in the whole European Union, Germany is expected of experiencing a population by about 10 million people by year 2050. Without immigration, Germany’s population is expected to shrink by about 14 million people by the same year (Morse, 2014). So, in order to allow more refugees, Germany decided to provide work permits to

asylum approved refugees after three months thereby making Germany the preferred destination for asylum seekers. France and United Kingdom (UK), unlike Germany, have some of the highest fertility rates in Europe whereas by 2050 the population will increase by 10 million people. These projections show that France and UK are in no need of any more people as also reflected in the strict policies such as those related to asylum permits. For example, it takes a year before the asylum seekers are granted with work permits in these countries. On the other hand, countries like Portugal and Greece have low fertility rate but also have high level of unemployment rate thereby forcing the governments to refuse any extra immigrants.

The difference in European migration policies may make some countries seem selfish and other countries seem generous but in reality, it is all based on the demographic and economic projections. Every European nation is reacting according to its own national interests and needs. It is important to note, however, that when something makes economic and demographic sense it does not mean that it is politically feasible. The influx of refugees in Europe produced political and social reactions in European societies. Unlike the past migrations, the current migration is chaotic and, as stated earlier, it affects every European state in a different way. This has created a fatal ground for the creation of anti-immigration groups and political parties within Europe.

The distinction between the term ‘migrant’ and ‘refugee’ is vital. A legal definition of a refugee is:

*A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (1951 Refugee Convention Amended by 1967 protocol UNHCR)*

In sum, a refugee is someone who flees an armed conflict or persecution while a migrant is someone who ‘chooses’ to leave his/her home in search of better education or employment.

Most European countries will turn down migrants and send them back to their own countries. However, according to the 1951 Refugee Convention, refugees have a number of rights under international law including the right not to be returned to their countries of origin (Article 33(1)). Nevertheless, it is important to note that a country has no legal obligation to a refugee until she/he

actually arrives in the country. So, in order to bend the rules, the European countries have extensively focused on preventing the refugees from arriving in their countries otherwise they will have legal obligation(s) to the refugees.

Europe's current moral panic over migration has thus generated unprecedented levels of interventions within Africa's 'sovereign' territory. This paper analyses Europe's migration crisis intervention in Africa through the EU Trust Fund to Africa. The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the Valetta European Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa as one of the EU externalization migration control strategies. The analyses the execution of this strategy, the ongoing projects under it and, how Europe's defensive posturing and extra-territorialisation will reshape its relationship with Africa and Africa's stability in general.

## **2.0 Methodology**

This study employed a case study research approach where EUTF for Africa was the main policy on focus. It is primarily a qualitative study, utilizing secondary data collected through the review of documents from various sources including peer reviewed articles, scholarly books, online sources and renowned international media sources. A thematic data analysis was employed where findings were ordered into descriptive categories around which most of the main elements of data results are presented.

## **3.0 Theories of migration**

According to Borjas (1989), a migration theory should be able to do three things: predict volume and directions of migration movements; take into account the assimilation processes of migrants; and evaluate the impact of migrants on the receiving economy. Currently, there is no single and coherent theory of international migration, but only a fragmented set of theories that have been developed largely in isolation from one another, quite often segmented by disciplinary boundaries (Ziyanak & Sert, 2018). Current trends and patterns in international immigration, however, suggest that a full understanding of contemporary migratory processes will not be achieved by relying on the tools of one discipline or by focusing on a single level of analysis alone. Rather, their multifaceted and complex nature requires a sophisticated theory that incorporates a variety of assumptions, levels, and perspectives. Most of the approaches are economic and tend to reduce the reality. It is because of such reasons that this study employed several migration theories in order to

expound the migration discourse and answer the question: 'Why does migration happen?' The need for migration theories is growing with the rising volume of migration and the globalization processes. More theories are increasingly becoming less monothematic and involve more interdisciplinarity (Massey, et al., 1993).

### **3.1 Push and Pull Factors Model**

In his study of "A Theory of Migration," Lee (1966) proposed the idea of "better opportunities," focusing on domestic and international migration. In terms of push and pull factors, the author provides a broad spectrum of information covering many conditions and factors that initiated domestic and international migration. He argues that immigration was the result of a cost-benefit decision or income-maximizing process between the origin and destination countries. Push factors refer to social, economic, and demographic concerns such as low wages, unemployment, crime, repressive governments, and so on. The pull factors refer to the maximizing opportunities that prevail abroad as opposed to the conditions in the homeland, such as employment, higher wages, freedom, and so on (Ziyanak & Sert, 2018).

The dual labour market theory can also be explained in the 'pull factor' assumption of this model. For example, Piore (1979) who has been the renowned proponent of dual labour market theoretical viewpoint argues that international migration is caused by a continuing demand for immigrant labour that is inherent in the economic structure of advanced countries. According to the same author, immigration is not caused by push factors such as high unemployment and low wages in sending countries, but by pull factors such as unavoidable need for foreign workers in receiving countries.

### **3.2 Chain Migration / Network Theory**

The chain migration theory and its extensions like network theory, is one of the important theoretical frameworks that can explain the current initiating factors of migration to Europe and it is reflected in the Dublin III regulation of the EU. MacDonald and MacDonald (1964) discuss the functionality of the social network in influencing international migration decisions. Furthermore, the network theory sees interactions among individuals, families and community as basic assumptions for both initiation and continuation of the international migration. According to this theory, migrants establish social ties in their countries of origin and destination, which increases the likelihood of others' immigration to a particular destination. Most importantly, networking

decreases the monetary risks of migration by making it more likely the immigrants will gain employment through their connections in their countries of origin (Massey, Alarcon, & Gonzalez, 1987).

This theory also explains the continuation of the immigration process. Having family members or friends at a potential destination also increases the likelihood of migrating to a location (Massey, Alarcon, & Gonzalez, 1987). Networks based on familial ties, or country of origin, such as friends, relatives, and ethnic communities, provide social support and make the immigration process safer and more manageable for the immigrants and their families. Once a network system has been established, migration becomes self-sustaining, and diffuses to the extent that large pools of people are able to migrate safely within its network (Massey, Goldring, & Durand, 1994). In this theory, individuals are not alone in the decision-making process; their families and social networks play a central role in that sense. Thus, even though structural forces caused migration at the outset, this was affected by internal mechanisms such as social networks and family links (Boyd, 1989).

As mentioned earlier, the significance of family reunification through migration is reflected in the Dublin III regulation. Dublin III Regulation, previously the Dublin II Regulation and Dublin Convention before that, is EU legislation which establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining which EU member state is responsible for examining an asylum claim made in the EU (European Commission, 2021). The criteria for establishing responsibilities are in hierarchical order where at the top of the hierarchy is ‘family unity’ provision where asylum seekers entering one of the EU member states will be taken to the EU’s country, the state where an asylum claimant's family members or relatives reside.

### **3.3 World Systems Theory**

This theory is based on Immanuel Wallerstein’s Neo-Marxist assumptions. It focuses on an uneven set up of world economic relations on core – periphery axis. It explains the clear division between the two blocks and the division of labour where core countries enjoy the benefits of global capitalism at the expense of periphery countries. This can explain why economic migrants are often moving from periphery countries to core countries, which is so as to change their positions in the economic hierarchy. Managers and owners of capitalist firms enter the peripheries of the world economy in search of labour, land, raw materials, and new consumer markets. Thus, according to Massey (1993), the World Systems Theory argues that international migration tends to follow the

economic and political organization of an expanding global market. This view yields six discrete hypotheses:

Firstly, international migration is a natural outcome of capitalist market formation in the developing or periphery world. This means that global economy penetration into peripheral regions is an impetus for international movement.

Secondly, the international labour flow follows the international flow of capital and goods, but in the opposite direction. Capitalist investment instills changes that create a mobile population in peripheral countries while simultaneously forging strong cultural and material links with core countries, bringing forth transnational movements.

Thirdly, international migration is most likely to occur between former colonial powers and their past colonies, because linguistic, cultural, transportation, administrative, investment, and communication links were long established and allowed to develop in the absence of outside competition during the colonial period, leading to the formation of specific transnational cultural and market systems.

Fourthly, since international migration emanates from the globalization of the market economy, the viable option for governments to influence the rates of immigration is by regulating corporations' overseas investment activities and by controlling international flows of goods and capital. However, such policies can hardly be implemented since it is difficult to enforce them, they tend to incite international trade disputes, and they will risk world economic recession, and antagonize multinational corporations with substantial political resources that can be mobilized to block them.

Another hypothesis has to do with military and political interventions by the governments of capitalist countries to protect investments abroad and to support foreign governments interested in the expansion of the global market. When such interventions fail, they produce refugee movements directed to particular core countries, constituting another form of international migration. This resonates to what has been happening directly or indirectly in the Middle East and some parts of Africa. Finally, international migration has little to do with wage rates or employment differentials between countries, but rather, it follows from the dynamics of market creation and the structure of the capitalist world economy.

### **3.4 Institutional Theory of Migration**

This theory examines the impact of state and nonstate organizations on migration. On one side, this theory focuses on the agents that are often needed by migrants and these agents often work illegally through human trafficking. On the other hand, it focuses on institutions that are raising down or up the barriers for migration. The European Union as a regional institution seems to be raising the barriers against immigration by ‘strengthening’ the institutions in the countries from which most of the migrants traveling to Europe originate or transit so as to curb migration.

There is a tendency for private institutions and voluntary organizations to arise once international migration has begun. They arise to satisfy the demand created by an imbalance between the large number of people who seek entry into rich and advanced countries as well as the limited number of visas these countries tend to offer. These imbalances as well as the barriers to entry that developed countries erect to keep people out, create a lucrative economic opportunity for entrepreneurs and institutions dedicated to promoting international movement for their profit, resulting to a black market in migration. As this underground market creates conditions conducive for victimization and exploitation, voluntary humanitarian organizations also arise in developed countries to improve the treatment and enforce the rights of legal and undocumented migrants.

Profit - oriented organizations and private entrepreneurs provide various services to migrants in exchange for fees set on the underground market. Such services may include: clandestine smuggling across borders; surreptitious transport to internal destinations; counterfeit visas and other documents; arranged marriages between legal citizens or residents of the destination country and migrants; labour contracting between migrants and employers; and credit, lodging, and other assistance in countries of destination. On the other hand, humanitarian groups help migrants by providing shelter, social services, counseling, legal advice about how to obtain legitimate papers, and even protection from immigration law enforcement authorities. The recognition of a gradual build-up of entrepreneurs, institutions, and organizations dedicated to arranging immigrant entry whether legal or illegal, yields hypotheses that are also quite distinct from those stemming from micro-level decision models.

First as organizations develop to support, promote, and sustain international movement, the international flow of migrants becomes more institutionalized and independent of the factors that originally caused it. Secondly, governments face some difficulties in controlling migration flows once they have begun because it is difficult to regulate the process of institutionalization. Given the

profits to be made by meeting the demand for immigrant entry, police efforts only serve to create a black market in international movements, and humanitarian groups tend to resist stricter immigration policies (Ziyanak & Sert, 2018).

Massey et.al. (1993) recommend that depending on which model is supported and under what circumstances, policymakers might be recommended by social scientists to attempt to regulate international migration through various approaches such as by:

- changing employment conditions and wages in destination countries;
- promoting economic development in sending countries;
- reducing income inequality in places of origin;
- establishing programmes of social insurance in sending societies;
- improving capital markets in developing countries; or
- combining some of these strategies

Twelve years later, this has been exactly what is done by the EU under the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

They also predicted that given the scale and size of contemporary migration flows and given the potential for misunderstandings and conflicts inherent in the emergence of diverse, multi-ethnic societies around the world, political decisions about international migration will be among the most important decisions made over two decades from when they made such a prediction in 1993. This proved to be true and it came into fruition including the time they predicted that such would happen.

## **4.0 Findings and Discussion**

### **4.1 Migration externalization**

The term externalization was raised to describe migration and border controls from the countries that receive migrants in the Global North into neighbouring countries and/or sending nations in the Global South (Frelick, et.al, 2016; Kipp & Koch, 2018; Lavenex, 2016; Menjivar, 2014). In some cases, externalization resembles outsourcing strategies in financial transactions whereby, in order to

increase profit margins, most costs are transferred to third parties. This especially comes to light when politicians of developed northern countries suggest that the political, economic and social costs of migration should be transferred to third countries, which are often located far from the country of final destination (Stock, Üstübici, & Schultz, 2019). Externalization measures also imply the policy initiatives geared towards managing migration in third countries. Such policy initiatives result in immobilizing would-be migrants in their countries of origin even along the way in transit-countries, and filter and select those migrants deemed adequate for further mobility (Frelick, Kysel, & Podkul, 2016).

The 1951's Refugee Convention which grants refugees rights under international law as long as they arrive on the soil of the country has made European governments paranoid on the incoming of refugees. As a result, European domestic authorities and Europe at large have resorted to the exertion of many muscular policy responses in response to the current migration crisis. These included a range of heightened patrols and militarized restrictions placed along both the sea and land (Landau, 2017). These are important, but by no means the only significant initiatives and, thus, the current move has been externalization of control measures.

Research has unveiled that during the last decade, there has been an increased tendency in certain regions and countries of immigration, especially the EU, the US and Australia to diversify and transfer migration management and border control mechanisms not only to neighbouring transit countries with the aim of diminishing refugee and migration flows, but also to more distant countries in Africa, Middle East, Asia and Central America (Stock, Üstübici & Schultz, 2019). These efforts are increasingly coupled with the instrumentalization of development assistance such as EU development aid for migration policy - making which are in line with the donors' interests (Geiger & Pécoud, 2012).

In response to the gradual increase in the number of people crossing the Mediterranean to seek asylum in Europe, in 2015 EU adopted its European Agenda on Migration aimed at better managing migration through the implementation of the following four pillars:

1. Reducing incentives for irregular migration.
2. Stepping up border management, both at the EU's external borders as well as by supporting third countries to develop their own border management.
3. Reforming the Common European Asylum System.

#### 4. Developing a new policy on legal migration.


Much of the global attention through both media and scholars, focused on what has come to be known as the ‘Turkey Deal’, announced on 12 November 2015, through which Turkey was offered around three billion Euros by the EU over two years to manage over two million refugees who had sought refuge in Turkey in exchange for Turkey’s agreement in restricting migration through Turkey towards the European Union (Kanter, 2015). This ultimately became a six billion Euros fund in 2016 (Gray, 2020).

Similarly, on 11 and 12 November 2015, a summit between African and European leaders was held in Valetta city in Malta which resulted in a European Trust Fund for Africa which was supported by at least 1.8 billion Euros (Landau, 2017). The plan is part of a strategy responding to a surge in arrivals in 2015 that has not only divided EU governments but also posed a serious threat to the Union's cohesion and credibility. The Trust Fund aims at assisting a band of countries across Africa that are among the most fragile and affected by migration and which draw the greatest benefit from this form of EU financial assistance.

#### **4.2 European trust fund for Africa**

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) was created to address the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration to contribute to good migration management. It is the main EU’s financial instrument for its political engagement in Africa (CONCORD, 2018). Currently, EUTF for Africa is worth over 5 billion Euros. EU contributes almost 88% of the whole contributions, and around 12% comes from EU member states and other donors (European Commission, 2020). It is at present operating in twenty six African states which are troubled by vast growing challenges including extreme poverty, demographic pressures, weak economic and social infrastructures, institutional weaknesses and internal tensions, environmental stress and limited resilience to food crises (European Commission, 2019). It is mostly dedicated to economic development and jobs creation, especially for women and young people in local communities. The other priority areas are supporting resilience to support basic services for local populations, migration management, as well as stability and governance by addressing human rights abuses, promoting conflict prevention and enforcing the rule of law.

#### ***Figure 1: EUTF for Africa Partner Countries***



**Source:** Annual Report: EU Trust Fund for Africa, European Commission (2017)

- The EU Trust Fund targets African countries that are the major migration routes to Europe. Eligible regions and countries to the Trust Fund are: Sahel region and Lake Chad which include Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Chad, Mali, the Gambia, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal; Horn of Africa in which Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are included and; North of Africa consisting of Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.


- .

To date, 254 programmes across the three regions have been approved by the Operational Committee of the EU Trust Fund for Africa for a total amount of approximately EUR 4.9 billion divided as follows: Sahel/ Lake Chad EUR 2145 million, Horn of Africa EUR 1808 million, and North of Africa EUR 900 million (Commission, 2020). Neighbouring countries of the eligible countries may benefit, on a case by case basis, from Trust Fund projects with a regional dimension in order to address regional migration flows and related cross- border challenges.

The main beneficiaries are internally displaced persons, refugees, returnees and the local communities hosting them, as well as other vulnerable or marginalised populations, such as victims

of human trafficking and smuggled migrants, women, youth and children. In addition to these, civil society actors such as community or women’s organizations are also supported.

**Figure 2: EU-ETFA Funding Allocation**



**Source:** Oxfam, 2017.

Oxfam found that 22% of the EUTF for Africa budget is allocated to migration management, 13.5% to security, peacebuilding and P-CVE, 63% to development cooperation and 1.5% to research and monitoring.

### 4.3 Types of projects under Trust Fund for Africa

Under this initiative, the following projects have been implemented as it was summarized in the report of European Commission on EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

#### 4.3.1 Establishing inclusive economic programmes

This focuses on the programmes that create employment opportunities, especially for young people and women in local communities, with a focus on vocational training and creation of micro and small enterprises. It contains the following projects:

- i. In Niger - Job creation in transit zones (€30 million), this project is implemented by the French cooperation agency (AFD).
- ii. In Ethiopia - Stemming Irregular Migration in Northern and Central Ethiopia (SINCE). The project aims at addressing the root causes of migration in Ahmara, Tigray SNNPR and Oromis regions. This is a project worth (€20 million) which targets to create economic opportunities and improve the job skills for the most vulnerable groups, women and the youth in particular

and it is implemented by the Italian Development Cooperation (IDC) with whom the contract was signed in December 2015.

- iii. In Libya – Regional Development and Protection Programme in the North of Africa. This project targets at contributing to the establishment of migrant- friendly inclusive services, fostering employment opportunities at community level, social cohesion and enhancing advocacy, as well as research and knowledge-sharing. At a regional level, the existing RDP in the North of Africa will receive additional funding (€10 million).

#### **4.3.2 Supporting resilience in terms of food security and of the wider economy**

This includes basic services for local populations, and in particular the most vulnerable, notably refugees and displaced people through community centers or other means of food provision and nutrition security, health, education and social protection, as well as environmental sustainability.

The following projects are ongoing:

- i. **Senegal - Strengthening resilience of the most vulnerable populations to nutritional and food crises in the departure areas (€8 million)** implemented by the Spanish cooperation agency (AECID).
- ii. **South Sudan – Health Pooled Fund (€20 million)**. The objective of this project is to increase health service delivery and to strengthen health systems at State and County level. Its activities are ongoing already under the implementation of the UK Department for International Development (DFID).
- iii. **Libya – Strengthening protection and resilience of displaced populations in Libya (€6 million)**, it will be implemented by a consortium of NGOs led by the Danish Refugee Council.
- iv. **Libya – Supporting protection and humanitarian repatriation and reintegration of vulnerable migrants in Libya (€20 million)**.

#### **4.3.3 Improving migration management in all its aspects**

It contributes to the development of national and regional strategies on migration management, containing and preventing irregular migration and fighting against trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants and other related crimes, effective return and readmission, international protection and asylum, legal migration and mobility, enhancing synergies between migration and

development. Based on these strategies, the EU is currently discussing with African partners a number of projects proposed on migration management such as:

**i. Niger - Response mechanism and resources for migrants (€7 million)**

The implemented of this project is by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and aims at supporting the country in the management of migration, promoting sustainable alternatives to illegal migration from Niger and fostering economic and social development through circular migration in the region.

**ii. Regional - Better Migration Management (€46 million)**

The project is being implemented by a consortium of EU Member States led by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).

#### **4.3.4 Supporting improvements in the overall good governance area**

The aim of this project is to support good governance by promoting conflict prevention, enforcing the rule of law and addressing human rights abuses, through capacity building in support of security and development, law enforcement including border management and migration - related aspects. Some actions will also contribute to prevent and counter extremism and radicalization. In this category we have two examples. Firstly, in Mali there is: *Strengthening security in Mopti and Gao regions and improving border areas (PARSEC Mopti-Gao)* worth €29 million. This project focus on ensuring effective presence of security forces operating in the context of civilian missions. It has been jointly designed with EUTM and EUCAP and will be implemented by Expertise France. Secondly, in Uganda, the project: *Enhancing social cohesion and stability of slums populations in Kampala which is worth €4.3 Million* aims to increase social cohesion and peace building amongst refugees and host communities by providing basic services and economic opportunities to both communities as well as enhancing refugees to participate in the social and economic life of local communities. This project is being implemented by IOM in consortium with Action for Fundamental Change and Development (AFFCAD).

These projects were established in the advent of the trust fund in November 2015. On 10<sup>th</sup> December 2020, the trust's mandate was extended until 31 December 2021 after which the fund will be succeeded by a new development mechanism with a small focus on migration, the Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) (Coggio, 2021). At

the end of December 2020, the implementation rate of commitment appropriations for the EUTF for Africa was 99% and 4.669 billion Euros had been contracted (Delasnerie, 2021).

#### **4.4 Critics of EU-ETFA Projects**

The EU Emergency Trust Fund makes predominant use of ninety percent of Official Development Assistance (ODA) which mostly come from the European Development Fund (EDF) (CONCORD, 2018). Its implementation should, therefore, be guided by the key principles of developmental effectiveness. There is a need to prevent the diversion of ODA from its main objective of poverty eradication. There is, however, an increasing concern that the EUTF is being used as a political tool focusing on quick-fix projects with the aim of stopping migratory flows to Europe which is not the purpose of ODA according to the EU's own Lisbon Treaty (CONCORD, 2018). There is also a concern that some funding from the EUTF unintentionally contributes to inhumane treatment of refugees and migrants, as it was in Libya. In addition, since addressing the drivers of forced migration requires a long term, sustainable and coherent approach, it is argued that the EU strategy of "quick-fixes" is very likely to fail.

European governments have been criticized as expecting to see the results of quick fixes where there are no quick solutions. The focus of the EUTF for Africa on '*stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa*' calls for both short-term and long-term responses to very different situations that have yet to be properly distinguished. The ability of individuals to travel across borders to engage in trade and labour in a regular way is important for their economic well-being, as well as for their communities of origin and the host communities. People who are displaced from their homes by crises such as disasters, conflict and persecution should be supported along their journey. The root causes of their displacement should as well be addressed not only for those who are able to flee but for the benefit of all those affected by crises.

Another critique has to do with political agenda of the assistance. The establishment of the EUTF for Africa, within the context of the European migration agenda, raised concerns among different actors including the NGOs that instead of being used for humanitarian purposes, aid would be used to promote European interests (Oxfam, 2017). The European migration agenda is dominant throughout the EUTF for Africa, and a big portion of its funding is invested in border management and security measures. Such measures have been criticized by Oxfam of not being able to meet

governments' expectations of stemming irregular migration and should not be expected to achieve this goal. To ensure that interventions funded from the EUTF for Africa do no harm and are sensitive to conflicts, the flexible funding must be balanced with adequate accountability mechanisms, in line with the development and humanitarian aid principles. Security measures should always be conflict-sensitive and should be designed to promote the security of individuals, with a focus on the needs of vulnerable individuals including women and children. This is particularly important when supporting the security forces of third states (Oxfam, 2017).

Castillejo (2017) argues that despite the stated goal of EUTF of addressing the root causes of irregular migration, it appears that the key actors have additional ambitions for the fund including: demonstrating actions on migration following political pressures, incentivising African cooperation on migration management and related activities, and using the fund's flexibility to develop innovative programming. Many African partners perceive the EUTF as part of European-imposed migration agenda that prioritises EU interests more than African ones and this is evidenced by weak Africans' ownership within EUTF. This creates the risk of alienating African partner states as well as overlooking local knowledge, priorities and capacities. Similarly, EUTF projects have been criticized of not being transparent and being ad hoc (Castillejo, 2017).

## **5.0 Conclusions**

Data show that irregular migration from Africa to Europe has declined since the EUTF was unveiled, but this doesn't imply that it is the primary reason for that decline. It is almost impossible to prove the causation, but evidence suggests that the fund has only modestly altered foundational social and economic factors driving migration, and has instead increased the ability of governments and others to control, surveil, and at times abuse migrants at or within their borders (Coggio, 2021).

The European crisis represents a deepening rupture in the universality of modernist development and an attempt to place African countries in a time-space of their own, if not of their own making. As good as the trust fund sounds, the logic behind it is that it is not the poor African refugee population that it aims to defend, but rather the European citizens. Interventions and political constructions are a defensive and particularistic approach in which it is only through the development of containment mechanisms that Europe can be protected.

What is important is how these initiatives move away from a universal language of human rights or human development, and focus on containment and a kind of autarchy. Although African countries

and people will not be disconnected from Europe, they will only be recipients of aid. With this kind of assistance they must shape their own futures whilst being disconnected from the global mobility networks that shape trade and wealth generation elsewhere. The billions of Euros of development aid promised after the Valetta conference will only be released in exchange for countries' committing to contain.

Reiterating the words of the deputy head of the European Commission Frans Timmermans, 'there are consequences for those who do not.' He openly said that the Union has proposed the mix of both negative and positive incentives to reward those countries that are willing to cooperate more effectively with the EU and they will make sure that consequences will fall upon those who will not. In an era of planetary urbanism and broader global entanglements (Brenner, 2012), fixing people in space produces a kind of diffracted geography that excludes people from what is required for them to be fully human. Even if the stated aim is to promote the rights of people to development at home, this reflects substantial denudation of humanity and rights.

Another issue in question is EU commission's initiative to finance foreign armies for the sole purpose of complementing their effort to stop people from fleeing to Europe and this includes countries with patchy human rights. €100 million that was initially given as aid would be diverted to finance military-led border control as well as other initiatives like mine clearing (Nielsen, 2016). What is scary is that this money would be pumped directly into these foreign military structures. Refugees flee these states to escape from war, political threats and persecution. This clearly shows that the political and military systems in these states are seriously flawed thus sending money directly to their military authorities to perpetuate the situation of unrest. Thus, it is more likely that they would rather use the resources to stay in power and suppress their opponents. History audibly speaks for itself that sponsoring foreign armies tends to backfire, the case of Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan is one of the many examples.

In sum, there is nothing wrong with the country taking all the necessary means to protect its citizens, in fact that is what every state should do. But such actions should not be taken at the expense of other people. The argument is not that Africa does not stand to benefit from this deal, but given the weak political and legal systems of most of African states, EU should not just shower money to the poor continent and threaten them that there will be consequences for those who refuse to *kiss the ring of their mighty hand*. Instead, long term consequences should be analyzed

imperatively to avoid further devastation of these struggling nations. If not, it might appear helpful while in reality it is just a time bomb waiting for erupting again in the near future.

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**Influence of Foreign Aid on Elections Management and Administration in Tanzania, 1995-2010**

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**Abstract**

*This article looks at the extent to which foreign aid influenced the electoral practices related to elections management and administration in Tanzania general elections of 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. This desk-based study employed a qualitative research approach which collected data through documentary review and analyzed the data through content analysis. The article, applies the input- based and conditionality- driven approach to gauge the elections management bodies (EMBs) compliance to donor conditionalities. The study findings reveal that donors had a significant influence on how elections were managed and administered. Donors' influence increased and decreased depending on the magnitude of foreign aid received by EMBs. This article recommends that, management and administration of elections is an internal matter which should be controlled by the EMBs. In order to control donors' influence, the government should allocate and release timely the entire budget requested by the EMBs for the exercise.*

**Keywords:** *compliance, conditionality, electoral actors, electoral process,*

**1.0 Introduction**

The first Tanzania development plan 1960 -1965 relied significantly on foreign support in which nearly 80 per cent was provided to support various development projects (Rist, 1997). The

country's dependency on foreign aid has been decreasing depending on the government ability to finance diverse projects using internal sources of funds. This reality is expressed in some of the country's budget, for example, in 1977 Tanzania's development budget was funded by international aid to a tune of about 60 per cent (Kelter, 2018). From 1990 to 1991 Tanzania was second, only to Mozambique, in its dependency on aid from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. Just like in many other African countries, foreign aid according to Hyden and Mukandala (1999) has become the life-line of Tanzania government.

Tanzania was in the late 1960s and early 1970s a favourite of the donor community because of its policy of socialism and national self-reliance (Hyden & Mukandala, 1999). Both bilateral and multilateral assistance to Tanzania increased in large proportions in this period. The willingness of donors to extend substantial amounts of aid to Tanzania in this period can be explained from two perspectives. First, Tanzania's development policies during that time were fairly matching with the dominant views of the social democrats in the North. Second, Tanzania was considered to be strategically important in terms of foreign policy considerations (Wangwe, 1997). It is important to note that except for some donor countries, aid provided during this time mostly came out of purely altruistic motive and was not attached to issues of elections financing at all. It is in this sense Mukandala (1999, p. 44) remarked that "in the early phase, USA aid was driven by the desire to have Tanzania in the Western camp within the context of the Cold War".

Foreign aid provided in 1960s and 1970s had conditionalities which were not related to elections financing and good governance. Since 1980s, donors started changing their aid policies as they started to tie them with political conditionalities related to elections, good governance and human rights (Dunning, 2004; Jeffrey, 1990; Montinola, 2010). The major reason for the donors' sudden change of motives is particularly that for Africa and Tanzania in particular, the 1980s and 1990s was a period of economic and political reforms. In this period, conditionality became the most important aid policy instrument used by donors to accomplish reforms, and was described as the most characteristic feature of aid (Ndumbaro, 2000; Selbervik, 1999).

The role of the western world in the drive towards democratization in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa came in the form of increased and more coordinated political pressures and conditionalities. The conditionalities were accomplished through three ways: state to state action, the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and finally, the influence of private donor agencies. This happened because African governments accepted the externally formulated Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) (Wilfred, 1994).

Tanzania in particular has held periodic elections without electoral assistance from donors (Ndumbaro & Yahya-Othman, 2007). The first elections in 1962 were held under a multiparty system and when the country adopted a single party system, elections were held after every five years, that is 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990. Zanzibar as well has had a long history of multiparty elections which happened before the year 1992. These include the 1957 July multiparty elections, 1961 January elections, 1961 June elections, and 1963 July elections. All these elections were funded by the Government of Tanzania. Most of the materials for the elections, and the campaigns, for the entire electoral processes were funded by the state (Cliffe, 1967; Malya, 2006).

The progressive provision of donors' aid to elections in Tanzania has become a common feature in the electoral process since the adoption of multiparty politics in 1992. Three reasons contributed to this matter. Firstly, the Government's inadequate resources to finance the whole electoral process opened the way to inviting external financiers to participate in the country's elections. Secondly, the government had the quest to acquire an international legitimacy of the electoral process and certification of elections results. Thirdly, the multiplicity of electoral process actors such as civil society organisations (CSOs), non-government organisations (NGOs) and opposition parties depended largely on foreign aid to conduct elections monitoring and observation, dissemination of civic and voter education and conducting active electoral campaigns.

In Tanzania, just like in many African countries, external pressure was partly responsible for the re-introduction of the multi-party system. This view is underscored by the *African Confidential* (as cited in Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, p. 29), that "the principal cause of Africa's wind of change is the World Bank and the donor countries (who) are explicitly demanding political change as a condition for further loans to Africa". The transition from a single party system to a multiparty system was neither natural nor an automatic undertaking. It was driven primarily by both internal political dynamics and external factors.

Donors did not begin becoming involved in a significant way in the issues of political reforms in Tanzania until 1990s. Internally, the political leadership took the lead to spearhead the reforms. The

former President, Julius K. Nyerere had called for open debate on multipartyism as early as February of 1990. In 1991, President Ali H. Mwinyi appointed a special commission headed by the then Chief Justice, Francis Nyalali, to collect views from the public on whether Tanzania should adopt multipartyism or maintain its one-party system. The Nyalali report (1992) said 80% of the Tanzania's population was not interested in the multi-party-political system (Baregu, 1994; Msekwa, 2006; Norman, 2011).

The commission's report eventually suggested the adoption of multiparty political system. Indeed, by early 1991 opposition groups were already operating openly. That is to say, while donors' influence has had an undeniable influence on Tanzania's movement towards multipartyism, it cannot be assigned credit as a causative factor. Thus, as Killian (2000) argues, seven years (1986-1992) after the signing of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), Tanzania embarked on political reforms and opted to re-introduce a multiparty system in 1992. However, some observers argue that multipartism hijacked the peoples' power, because it was against the wishes of the public. Therefore, it came due to democratic changes which were sweeping across the globe at that time, thus Tanzania had no other choice but to adopt multipartism (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1992; Musoke, 1992).

The western donors' influence had some significant effect in Tanzania as it has in other African countries. Indeed, since Tanzania is widely considered to be among the most aid dependent of African countries, the factor of western influence cannot be ignored. As explained previously, a major portion of Tanzania's development budget and a large share of its recurrent budget were made up of donors' fund, its infrastructure, health, and education systems are heavily dependent upon various forms of donors' support (Christiana et al., 2020). Therefore, the impact of donors' pressure on the re-introduction of multiparty politics was undoubtedly heightened by the fact that it came from so many different sources, thus it created an impression that donors were, to great extent acting in concert in imposing democratic conditions on their financial assistance. Among the countries that exerted pressure for democratization were the Tanzania's traditional most important donors, including the Scandinavian countries, Britain and the United States (Lofchie & Mukandala, 1998).

The re-introduction of multipartism in 1992 in Tanzania was followed by the open and direct donors' financing of the 1995 general elections. The change of donors' focus from non-interfering

in the country's elections before 1992 and the start of disbursing aid to elections in the country immediately after the restoration of multiparty political system illustrates that aid has never been non-political, neutral or simply a technical exercise of providing resources to improve development. In this sense, many aspects of foreign aid hold political implications that require consideration, including the way in which it is disbursed, the areas prioritized, who gets funded, and how the funds are utilized by the recipients and the ultimate outcome of such interventions. Reflecting on the above reality, Tanzania is, therefore, a good case in which to examine the relationship between political conditionalities and foreign aid disbursements in elections management and administration.

## **2.0 Research Problem**

The adoption of multiparty elections is just one step in the long process towards the introduction of liberal democracy in Tanzania. Since the adoption of a multiparty political system in 1992, Tanzania has conducted six general elections that of 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020. Preparing and running multiparty elections is an expensive undertaking and a financial burden for poor and underdeveloped African countries. Tanzania has always welcomed international electoral support to help the conduct of periodic electoral processes. In response to this state of affairs, donors have made funds available for elections, something which is particularly welcome for most of developing countries.

To quote Chambers (2005, p.40): *electoral assistance involves large budgets and has become more sophisticated and is the most widely accepted form of democratic assistance and yet the least likely to add to democratization.* Most of donors' electoral support takes the form of technical and financial assistance in various areas. Aliyu (2017) argues that electoral support is usually directed to potential actors of the electoral process, such as EMBs, for management and administration of elections, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) for conducting civic and voter education, elections observations and political parties support for effective participation in the electoral campaigns.

Since the 1990s, there has been a significant donors' electoral support in elections management and administration in Tanzania. Foreign funds have been part and parcel in financing various aspects and stages of the electoral process. While many studies on the role and influence of foreign aid to development and politics of the Third World countries like Tanzania are available, little knowledge

does exist in relation to the role and influence of foreign aid in elections management and administration. This study covers four general elections of 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 to explain the relations between foreign aid, elections management and administration in Tanzania. The 1995-2010 elections are taken into consideration because in this period the influence of donors in the exercise is explicitly seen unlike the recent multiparty elections of 2015 and 2020.

### **3.0 Literature Review**

Multiparty elections financing in Africa is not entirely a domestic matter but a question linked to external support. Mkandawire (cited in Cowen & Laakso, 2002, p. 218) elaborates: “It’s of interest to accept the fact that, donors’ do support elections in most of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) at the rate ranging from 25% to over 50% of total elections costs. They thus form one of the largest stakeholders in the electoral game”. The increasing role of donors in developing countries is an unquestionable fact which has, to a great extent, been influenced by electoral support provided to recipient countries. This is well stated by Hyden and Mukandala (1999) who argue that in the 1990s some US\$ 50 billion were transferred from donors to recipient countries every year in the form of official development assistance (ODA). This has made bilateral and multilateral aid agencies very important actors in international relations and the national politics of many Third World countries (Molly, 2019).

Lancaster (1992) noted that foreign aid is not only controversial but also a contentious issue. This is due to the suspected covert and overt motives and intentions of foreign donors’ and their agencies. No aid is given from donors to recipient actors without some attached conditionalities. Lancaster further claims that aid is often used by the government providing it to encourage or reward politically desirable behaviour on the part of the government or actors receiving it. Dreher et al., (2019) argue that foreign aid reflects humanitarian values and economic interests of the giving governments. This suggests that through foreign aid giving, donors find avenues to channel their interests to recipient actors. In this sense, even the promotion of electoral democracy by financing the electoral processes in the third world countries is not independent from this claim.

Not all foreign aid is the same and not all donor’ (bilateral governments, multilateral organizations and International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) give foreign aid for the same reason. The examination of the motivations of donors to provide foreign aid also includes analysis of

government executive objectives and geo-strategic concerns. In this case, foreign aid is deployed for a number of reasons and in pursuit of a number of goals. Some of these goals may either be to present an image in the international community of generous nation or to appease political and commercial interest (Hook, 1996; Lancaster, 2007).

Electoral assistance has largely been allocated to Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) of recipient countries. In this case, the EMBs are in most countries the authorities mandated to organize, supervise and conduct the activities of the electoral processes (Chiroro, 2010; De Tollenaere, 2006). They usually manage at least one, but usually more of the following activities: registering of voters, registering of political parties and candidates, conducting polling, counting and tabulating votes and declaration of elections results (Kambale, 2011; Reilly, 2004). Binder (2009) points out that given their important role, electoral assistance to EMBs can contribute to significant improvements of various key components of the electoral process. In particular, assistance aim at strengthening the physical infrastructure of EMBs and capacity building of core EMB's staff.

On the other side some scholars argue that international electoral support to EMBs has not been successful in achieving sustainable outcomes. Capacity building has often been downgraded to not much more than 'on-the-job training' for national EMBs staff. Instead, international election advisors become implementers instead of advisors. This makes donors frequently exert significant influence over how key electoral policies are designed, approved and implemented and thereby affecting the democratic qualifications of electoral processes (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2004; Dezeeue, 2004; UNDP et al., 2011; Lucy & David, 2018). Leandro *et al.* (1999) and Darnolf (2011) observe that EMBs compliance to donors' conditionalities makes international advisors often be involved in drafting amendments to legislative frameworks, procuring commodities, improving transparency and credibility, developing new voter registration methodologies, assisting in poll worker training, producing voter education campaigns and overhauling election results management systems.

It is further claimed by Leandro *et al.* (1999) that EMBs compliance to donors' conditionalities requires EMBs to purchase goods and services from nationals of the donors' concerned. Often, the costs of purchasing from external dealers are considerably higher than the costs of purchasing from suppliers in-country, inflating overall electoral costs. This suggests that depending on their

mandate, international advisors can even formally be part of an EMBs decision-making body as commissioners and thereby exert significant influence over rules, regulations and decisions.

#### **4.0 Theoretical Framework**

The conceptual framework that guides this study is input - based and conditionality - driven approach. The most important argument of this framework as emphasized by Riddell (2007) is that there is a direct relationship and mutual agreement between official donors' conditionality and recipient's response or compliance. This implies that no foreign aid is given for free from donors to recipients. This suggests that most of aid provided by donors' is associated with specifically attached conditions, which require recipients to comply in order to obtain such assistance. All aid donors, both governmental and non-governmental, have an obligation to ensure that the funds they provide are used as efficiently and effectively as possible for the purpose intended. .

Policy conditionality, as insisted by Andrew *et al.* (2006) has been one of the means to try to ensure that this happens. Donors may impose explicit conditions and requirements about how they believe that aid should be used and then withhold or withdraw aid if these conditions are not met. In this way, important questions come out such as what has this policy conditionality played in the allocation of aid and the manner in which it has been provided? And for how much the development objectives of aid programmes have been distorted by the use of aid for donors' commercial and political advantage? There are two schools of thought which originate from the preceding explanation. One is that the effects of foreign aid to electoral processes in recipient actors have been profound and the other is that the effects of foreign aid have been less so. There is a large body of literature on the influence of aid donors over recipient actors (Brown, 2006; Harrison, 2001; Sogge 2002; Stokke, 1995; Tarp & Hjertholm, 2008). The aim, as far as this study is concerned, is only to highlight a few relevant concepts and conclusions which can serve to structure and guide the analysis of foreign aid influence to the Tanzanian elections' management and administration. Frerks (2006, p.15) provides a useful definition of the concept: 'Conditionality is the promise or increase of aid in the case of compliance by a recipient with conditions set by a donor, or its withdrawal or reduction in the case of non-compliance'.

Consequently, it is worth concluding from the presented contending views that the effects of foreign aid to electoral processes in recipient actors have been profound. The influence of donors revolves around the concept of power relations among actors participating in the electoral process in Tanzania. The high dependency of electoral process actors to donors' means that the financiers will have a big influence in the manner elections are managed and administered in Tanzania. This is reflected by the tendency of all actors in the electoral process to abide to the conditions of electoral assistance which represent the actual interests of the donors.

### **5.0 Research Method and Data Analysis**

The study was conducted as a desk-based research. This involved a review and assessment of various documentary sources containing secondary information related to foreign aid, elections management and administration in the country. These included amongst other things reputable journals, different articles, periodicals, proceedings, magazines, newsletters, websites, newspapers, working papers, books, Election Acts, theses, multi-party election reports for various stakeholders in Tanzania, donor documents and government's documents.

The study employed a content analysis qualitative data analysis technique because it was useful in providing an in-depth understanding of a social phenomenon of elections which happened from 1995 to 2010. The major substance of analysis in content analysis is communications (Babbie, 1992). Despite drawbacks of content analysis such as being limited to the examination of recorded communications and the possibility of the problem of validity and reliability, its advantages outweigh its demerits hence being useful in this study. The advantages of the content analysis include its being economical in terms of time, money, resources such as staff; it is easier for partial or full explicability, allows one to study processes occurring over long periods of time, and it is unobtrusive in the sense that it seldom has any effect on the subject being studied.

### **6.0 Findings and Discussion**

Since the re-introduction of multiparty system in Tanzania, six multiparty elections have been conducted including that of 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020. All these elections were organized and supervised by the national EMBs which are the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) as empowered by Article 74 of the 1977

constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania. Makulilo (2015) argues that, the NEC budget comes from two sources: the government and the external donor community. Both sources are sometimes unreliable because funds can be inadequate or can be delayed. The NEC does not have a budget directly voted for by the legislature, instead its funds are voted for as part of the budget of the Prime Minister's Office. Each time the NEC organises elections or a by-election, it has to request requisite financial and other resources from the Prime Minister's Office. The availability of funds is, therefore, dependent on the state of funds in the Prime Minister's Office as well as the Treasury.

The above explanation indicates a structural weakness facing the EMBs' in Tanzania. Lack of reliable sources of funds provided an opportunity for donors to disburse funds to recipient electoral actors and influence the management and administration of elections. As a result, the EMBs relied significantly on foreign aid financially and for technical assistance to facilitate the effective running of the elections (Aliyo & Ambali, 2021). The involvement and influence of donors in EMBs activities for 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 elections are discussed in this section. Donors' financing of elections in Tanzania began in the 1995 general elections. In these elections, the EMBs required a total budget of Tshs 44 billion from the government for management and administration of elections. However, the Government of Tanzania reduced the budget from Tshs 44 billion to Tshs 37 billion due to economic constraints and hardly managed to contribute Tshs 21 billion, amounting to 78% of the total Tshs 37 billion elections cost. The donors contributed Tshs 8.5 billion which is equal to 22% of the EMBs request (NEC, 1996).

In the 2000 general elections, the same thing happened although this time the government's contribution rose up from 78% of 1995 to 86%. The EMBs required a total budget of Tshs 76.7 billion, which was reduced again by the government to Tshs 39.8 billion, a slight increase of the amount required in 1995. The government at last managed to offer Tshs 34.1 billion and the rest Tshs 5.7 billion, was contributed by donors, making the total elections cost to be Tshs 39.8 billion in 2000 elections (NEC, 1996; 2001). On the contrary, In the 2005 general elections, the total elections cost reached Tshs 62.53 billion. The original amount required by the EMBs was Tshs 88 billion including Tshs 48.4 billion for the conduct of elections and Tshs 39.6 for the establishment of the Permanent National Voters' Register (PNVR). The Government of Tanzania afforded to give

the EMBs Tshs 58.7 billion worth 95% and donors contributed Tshs 3.53 billion which was only 5% of the total elections cost (NEC, 2006).

Further, the elections estimate cost for 2010 general elections was Tshs 151.8 billion although in actual sense, the EMBs spent Tshs 154.5 billion for elections purposes. Thus, there was unexpected spending of Tshs 2.6 billion over the estimated budget due to the postponement of parliamentary elections in seven constituencies and councillors' elections in twenty-three wards, thus making the total elections cost to become Tshs 154.5 billion. This figure was higher than the previous elections costs of (1995, 2000 and 2005) because it included the cost of updating the Permanent National Voter Register (PNVR) and the management of elections. The government disbursed Tshs 135.6 billion which equals to 89% and donors contributed Tshs 18.9 billion that equals to 11% which was directly spent by the EMBs for management and administration of elections (NEC, 2006; 2011).

The broad picture presented above shows that the EMBs consistently depended on donors' support in the elections of 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. However, such dependency was decreasing respectively from 1995 compared to other elections of 2000, 2005 and 2010. The EMBs donors' dependency decreased largely because the government increased the disbursement of all elections cost to EMBs from 78% of (1995) up to 89 % in (2010). In response to the government's actions, donors decreased the disbursement of all elections' costs to EMBs from 22% of (1995) to 11% in (2010). The justification for the government's decision to increase fund disbursements to EMBs was to avoid the overwhelming donors' influence in the activities of the EMBs. This means that at times when donors contributed a huge amount of funds, their influence was significant in the management and administration of elections, to the extent of overruling the decisions of the EMBs. TEMCO (2006, p.112) supports these facts by arguing that "in the elections of 1995 and 2000 donors' contributions were so significant that they almost had a final say on the conduct of elections in Tanzania". On sharing his opinions on this matter, Nyirabu (2009, p.16) commented "undoubtedly donors' conditionalities are overpowering democratic practice in Tanzania by empowering international technocrats who are not accountable to the local electorate". He further claims that, among others the development partner-driven processes are enshrined in the memorandum of understanding which recipient actors sign to indicate their compliance to funders' dictations on how decisions will be made concerning the management and administration of elections. In short, donors' conditionalities reduced the decision-making powers of the EMBs. As a

result, these agreements of assistance make the government and EMBs answerable to external donors and not to the citizenry.

The above assertion is validated by the evidence that in 1995 elections donors demanded the EMBs to submit weekly reports to donors, including information on complaints received in relation to the electoral processes. Another condition in these elections compelled the EMBs to make decisions with the assistance of the external election advisors. It was agreed that the Royal Danish Embassy could, on behalf of the group of donors, and at any time, withhold disbursements if the objectives of the support were endangered or if reports were not delivered as agreed. The Embassy had also the right to stop disbursing the electoral support fund to EMBs if the principal management of the project was not satisfactory, or if the project developed unfavourably in terms of the objectives in any important respect, or if the general atmosphere for democratic, free and fair preparation, campaigning and vote casting was seriously jeopardized (*Daily News, 09/08/1995*).

In the same elections, donors put a condition to the government that votes should be counted at the polling stations instead of district centres. The government initially did not accept such directives from donors, but later on it concurred with their demands. As Mukandala (1999) points out that the basic demands by the opposition regarding the conduct of the electoral process were ignored by the ruling party and the government, until when they were supported by the donors' community. As an example, the call by opposition parties to have votes counted at the place where the polling took place was rejected until when donors made it a condition for funding the elections. This reveals that the government depended much from donors in 1995 elections, hence fearing to miss such support, it concurred with the donors' conditionalities and the votes were counted at the polling stations.

TEMCO (2011, p.62) reports that:

*Donor funding was significant in the 1995 and 2000 elections, which gave donors some say in the manner in which the polls were managed. In the 1995 elections, for example, donors pressurised the NEC to allow the counting of votes at polling stations. This was adopted and since then, it has reduced tensions surrounding the transfer of ballot boxes. A commission report indicated that a senior government*

*official from the Prime Minister's office tried to attend a NEC meeting where that decision was made; the NEC prevented him from doing so.*

Conformity with the counting of votes at the polling stations was gladly welcomed by donors. As reported by NEC (1996), the Government of Canada provided 438 million out of 605 as promised earlier. This amount was used by the EMBs to purchase 16,700 ballot boxes and 57000 hurricane lamps to facilitate the counting of the ballots at the polling stations instead of at district centres. The hurricane lamps were necessary because most of the rural areas were not electrified (*Daily News*, 03/08/1995).

A further donors' condition to the EMBs in the same elections, as explained by Mushi and Mukandala (1997), forced the EMBs to allow donors to position their own supply experts in the distribution of electoral materials. Initially, the EMBs rejected these offers from Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Commonwealth and other donors, but finally the financial limits compelled the EMBs to accept the Commonwealth offer very late and reluctantly. The donors' assistance included tamper proof envelopes, indelible ink, dry cells for lantern lamps, polling booths, writing pads, voter education materials and stamp pads. Donors' late disbursement of the funds frustrated the EMBs plans and therefore, contributed to the mismanagement and administration of the elections. In connection to the above explanation, the report of TEMCO (1997, p.162) made the following remarks:

*Strange as it may seem, even the people who painted and labelled the boxes had to be sent from Dar es Salaam as per donors' dictates. In some instances, even the labelling of boxes was done wrongly. This was witnessed, for example, in Mtwara and Ruvuma Regions. Materials reached many regions late or were sent to wrong destinations, this was the case for example, with Shinyanga, where materials were sent to Nzega. Mwanza become a clearing house as it received materials for Kagera and Shinyanga.*

Similarly, donors wanted also to control the tendering process and procurement of election materials by favouring their own companies, as a condition of their support and in case the EMBs refused, they threatened to withdraw their support immediately. Time constraints and the need to go through a competitive process, made many national institutions miss out tenders because of lack

of experience in preparing competitive proposals. Big international firms won electoral contracts because of their ability and experience of working with elections. TEMCO (2006, p. 112) reports this issue regarding the 1995 elections as follows:

*It was noted that in the previous elections, donors had a nearly final say on the conduct of elections in Tanzania. More often than not, donor money comes with attachments. One such that attachment was to require NEC to procure materials from donor country. At these times, tenders had to be approved by donors and in some cases; NEC was overruled in its various decisions. Worse still, donors released money at their own pace, and in many cases, at the last minute thus frustrating work schedules.*

In a more influential manner during the 1995 elections, the EMBs accepted donors' conditions for ballot papers to be printed in Great Britain. In this elections Ballot papers weighing 90 tonnes were received in Dar es Salaam from Great Britain in three phases, and this quantity (of ballot papers) included in each case 523,631 ballot papers (5.9%) over and above the number of voters who were registered for those elections. The transportation and printing of these ballot papers was also financed by Britain at a cost of about 1.2 million pounds sterling (NEC, 1997). Thus, had the EMBs refused to award that tender to Great Britain, the same would have withdrawn their support. Since the EMBs and the government had no money at that time, they had no choice but to accept (*Daily News, 06/09/1995*).

The EMBs' compliance to donors' demands was fuelled more by a lack of adequate funds to cater for extra expenses due to problems which emerged in the seven constituencies of Dar es Salaam region on 29<sup>th</sup> October, 1995. These challenges caused the EMBs to order re-elections on 19<sup>th</sup> November, 1995 at an extra cost of Tshs 2,511,443,120/= which the EMBs was not able to afford. The only donor who came to rescue the EMBs crisis was Britain (through ODA) which paid for the printing of 9,453,600 fresh ballot papers at the cost of Tshs 70,348,660/= (NEC, 1997).

The overall relationship of the EMBs and donors was hostile in the 1995 elections, since the intervention of donors in the EMBs activities was paramount then the donors were able to implement their desires in the electoral process. As such, when the EMBs sometimes refused to compromise with the government's interests, donors punished the EMBs by either threatening to

withdraw their support, deliberate delay of funds release or not giving the actual amounts as promised. Consequently, these actions from donors affected the activities of the EMBs as the situation became worse and frustrating to EMBs activities.

For example, it was stated that initially, in 1995 elections, donors had promised the Tanzanian government that they would contribute about Tshs 20 billion to finance the presidential and parliamentary elections. The pledges were made to the government, not to the EMBs. However, donors actually contributed only about 22.1% of the elections cost of about Tshs 8.5 billion. This left the EMBs deep in debt as it owed election officials and suppliers of election materials a total of Tshs 8.1 billion, equivalent to 21.0% deficit of the total election bill. These suppliers and officials threatened to sue the EMBs upon failing to pay their money. The EMBs were receiving election funds behind the set schedules and this caused accumulation of activities awaiting the availability of money. For instance, the funds released during the registration period were not enough and this factor drove the EMBs to request from donors Tshs 1,600,000,000/= to pay the Registration Assistants their allowances so that they could release registration statistics to enable EMBs to go on with the elections' timetable (NEC, 1997).

Despite the problems caused by the donors in the 1995 elections, the government continued to depend on the donors' support in the subsequent general elections. As a result of the bad experience during the previous elections, one would expect the government and the EMBs to have prepared alternatives and more autonomous sources of funding the 2000 general elections. On the contrary, they relied upon financial support from the same sources. This is a tendency which has been described by Moyo (2009) as a dependency syndrome leading to erosion of creativity and self-reliance initiatives. Dependency on donors for the 2000 elections allowed donors, once again, to penetrate their interests in the electoral process. However, this time there was a slight change as the EMBs refused donors' dictations in some incidences, and when donors withdrew their support, the government intervened and covered the expenses.

To highlight some few cases in the 2000 elections, the donors' condition to demand control over the tendering process to favour their own companies and to give materials to their technical supply experts were also experienced in the elections. The EMBs awarded tenders worth over 2.5 billion in the 2000 elections to local and international companies for several services including the printing and supplying of ballot papers. For instance, for the supply of voter education materials, the

government awarded the tender to Skipco (pty) Limited from South Africa, which was expected to supply the documents at a cost of Tshs 171,161,937/=. The German based Bureau for Institutional Reform and Democracy (BIRD) was also awarded a tender by the government worth Tshs 207,930,047/= to provide consultancy services on the electoral process (*Daily News*, 18/09/2000).

The tenders for printing ballot papers and voter education materials were invited by the European Union (EU), and dealt with a special committee which comprised technical experts from the EU, the Treasury and the EMBs. Tenders were opened on 19<sup>th</sup> May, 2000. The EMBs was informed by EU that Tshs 3,254,309,375/= had been budgeted for the printing of ballot papers. Later on, as a matter of surprise, the EU withdrew its assistance for financing the printing of the ballot papers. This happened because the European Union's preferred company, with less experience and competence, was not granted the tender by the EMBs (NEC, 2001). The European Union (EU) wanted to get an advantage of paying low costs for the printing of the ballot papers since its preferred company was ready to work at a cost of Tshs 1.2 billion. This happened because their bid was lower than those of more competent and experienced companies preferred by the EMBs. The second lowest bidder who was more experienced and competent and of the EMB's choice, had tendered Tshs. 1.9 billion.

Wangwe (2002) reiterates that conditionalities in terms of procurement policy or politics are often donor-driven and are characterized by much asymmetry since such conditionalities seem not to be negotiated by both parties on an equal footing. In reference to this experience, NEC (2001, p. 57-60) remarked as follows:

*The European Union was requested to release the Tshs 1.2 billion and told that the government of Tanzania would top up the difference. The European Union still refused, instead, the European Union was prepared to provide a technical expert who would enable the company of their choice to manage the job. At least at this time, the Commission refused these conditions from European Union to be used as a guinea pig, considering the sensitive nature of elections; as a result, the Government supported the Commission and fully funded the printing of ballot papers.*

An important matter to consider is that at least at this time the government and the EMBs were able to show their power by refusing the donors' conditions as depicted in the scenarios above. The power to disagree with donors' dictations was not because the government of Tanzania had enough money by that time, but because the government learned rightly from the bitter experiences it encountered in the 1995 elections, where donors gave significant support and consequently, dictated and overruled the decisions of the government and the EMBs. However, such government actions made donors to delay disbursing their contributions to EMBs. This situation had serious implications to the electoral process, as some of the donors did not contribute the amount as per commitment. This led the EMBs to adjust and cut some of the expenses which were to be paid by donors. For example, the EMBs were compelled to revise the implementation plan which was initially scheduled to start in July 1999, but ended up waiting until February 2000.

Moreover, donors' delay in releasing their contributions caused confusion in the tendering process for the procurement of electoral materials. This matter caused the EMBs to make several amendments to some election legislations, reducing the costs of elections. As such, the EMBs had to stop the practice of paying allowances to political parties polling agents and combined and redesigned certain forms to cut down printing expenses (Chaligha, 1997; NEC, 2001).

The reliance on donors' funding had three adverse effects particularly to the 2000 electoral process: Firstly, donors made last minute decisions to fund the procurement of elections materials which were already at the tendering and bidding stage. This led to complaints because original bidders did not know about the change. Secondly, the late withdrawal of the EU to fund the printing of ballot papers compelled the Government to provide extra funds for that activity. Thirdly, donors' contribution decreased from 8,662,764,800/= which was promised earlier to 5,767,370,900/= as a result of the withdrawal of the EU from the printing of ballot papers. Besides, the contribution from USAID was also lessened because they (USAID) joined the Donor Basket Group hence putting their money in that Basket (NEC, 2001).

It would seem that, the government and the EMBs learnt a lesson in the 1995 and 2000 elections, where their dependency on donors was high, and the donors controlled most of the EMBs activities. This suggests that when donors increased support to EMBs, the donors' hand was very strong in influencing the decisions of elections' management and administration.. In response to donors' actions, the government took firm decisions to increase disbursements of funds to EMBs for the

2005 and 2010 elections to limit donors' influence in the EMBs activities. This change shows that the government was suspicious of the donor community's conditions which jeopardized the country's sovereignty. This implies that the government approached donors to support the elections and the donors refused because the government was not ready to accept the conditions of assistance set by them.

Generally, the funds for 2005 and 2010 elections from both the government and donors were released on time and this made it possible for the EMBs to follow the elections' timetable. In the 2005 elections, the United National Development Programme (UNDP) established a Programme Management Unit (PMU) to run the day-to-day activities related to the programmes managed by the UNDP. Consultancy, procurement of some of the materials, logistics, Geographical Information System (GIS), website, results centre and other aspects of technology financed by donors helped to facilitate the smooth running of the elections.

Likewise, for the 2010 elections, the UNDP through the Election Support Project (ESP) financed and gave to EMBs various materials meant for updating of the PNVR, the general elections and improvement of computer systems which included the record management system, candidate management system, result management system for presidential and parliamentary elections, incidents management system and the system which enabled voters' to send short messages services (SMS) through their mobile phones, or voter interaction system (NEC, 2006; 2011). However, there were delays in the transfer of committed funds by a few development partners such as the EU and the Netherlands Embassy due to certain conditionalities. In the case of the EU, the agreement included condition to hold a part of the funds until the end of the project. This proves the argument that conditionalities played a great role in the electoral processes, even though this time around, such delays did not adversely affect the implementation of the elections support project compared to previous elections.

Furthermore, the UNDP financed the procurement of additional ballot boxes and seals. Large - scale support to procurement of voter registration equipment was through Deepening Democracy Tanzania Project (DDTP) and Election Support Project (ESP) led to the updating of the PNVR resulting in an increase of registered voters from 15.6 million to 19.7 million on the mainland. Technical advice and material support were provided by donors to the EMBs for rolling out voter registration on the mainland, enabling a transition from obsolete Polaroid photos to digital camera technology; this included procurement of voter registration kits utilizing solar technology

(implemented through DDTP and ESP). The project met also the running costs of voter registration and a computer expert from donors was provided to EMBs to assess the voter registration information technology system (NEC, 2011).

As presented above, for the 2005 and 2010 elections hardly did the donors control and influence the EMBs' activities; only a minimal positive influence of donors' support to the EMBs activities is seen through technical advice to establish the PNVR, results management system; establishment of election results centre through media use and establishing an effective information technology which helped to manage the elections in a better way compared to the previous elections. However, the EMBs were required to submit monthly reports to the donors to enable them evaluate the progress of donor-funded activities. The development partners' support to EMBs was provided following the government's request for such assistance. Therefore, due to the availability of enough funds from the Government of Tanzania about 95% of total elections costs largely contributed to successful management and administration of 2005 and 2010 elections. Thus, the government positively influenced the handling of the elections for the motive of consolidating the democratization process in Tanzania (TEMCO, 2011).

## **7.0 Conclusion**

Following the events, actions and decisions that unfolded in the conduct of the electoral processes from 1995 to 2010, the critical analysis about elections management and administration in Tanzania informs that it was impossible for these elections to be conducted without donors' support to the EMBs. The general trend revealed that while the EMBs dependency to donors decreased, the government increased the disbursement of funds to the EMBs respectively from 1995 to 2010. As a response to the Government and EMBs actions, the donors' disbursement of funds to EMBs decreased respectively from 1995 to 2010.

This is evidenced by the 1995 and 2000 elections where the EMBs dependency to donors was too high to the extent that donors had almost the final say on EMBs activities. On the other side, for the 2005 and 2010 elections, the EMBs reliance on donors decreased tremendously. Donors' interests were not fulfilled in these elections because the EMBs had adequate funds from the government to plan for better elections management and administration. Therefore, the donors' influence decreased and thus they failed to control the EMBs activities.

## 8.0 Recommendations

This article recommends that donors need to recognize that their role in strengthening electoral democracy is very important but limited, as is their influence on the process or results of the electoral process in Tanzania. The EMBs in the country need to carefully revisit their engagement with donors by reducing or developing self-reliant initiatives to avoid increasing their dependency on overseas' support. The Government of Tanzania learnt a bitter lesson for not disbursing enough funds to EMBs for 1995 and 2000 elections, as a result, donors had huge influence on elections management and administration. A change of practice happened in 2005 and 2010 elections where donors' influence did not happen because the EMBs had enough resources from the government. This matter empowered the EMBs to have full control of the activities related to elections management and administration.

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**The Role of SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) in Ensuring Market Availability for  
Tanzania's Products**

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***Abstract***

*The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Free Trade Area provides a platform for its member states to enjoy the extended market opportunities. Tanzania being one of the member states needs to enjoy a myriad possible advantage of its membership by trading its various products in the region. The study assessed the role SADC Free Trade Area in ensuring market availability for the products of the member states, particularly Tanzania. This study adopted a descriptive research design to describe the relationship between Tanzania export and the SADC market. The Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) through the Balassa Index was used to measure the comparative advantage that Tanzania had on products exported to other trading partners. The study used secondary data obtained from the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) from the year 2008 to 2018. The results affirm that Tanzania enjoys a sound comparative advantage over its trading partners on several products. Findings further indicate that the share of exports to SADC region is also affected negatively by some factors such as GDP of member states, transport cost, exchange rates and difference in economies of scale. Basing on the study findings, the study urges deliberate measures to be taken to promote local technology by improving infant industries, financial sector accessibility which provides friendly financial assistance to traders and improvement of the infrastructure towards leveraging maximum export performance to SADC member states.*

***Keywords:*** market availability, revealed comparative advantage, SADC Free Trade Area,

**1.0 Introduction**

Trade integration is among the factor that can create growth and welfare improvement in the region (Calderon, Cantu & Zeufack, 2020). Regional integration in Africa has long history since formation of South Africa Customs Union in 1910 (Dyegula & Lwesya, 2018). For the past four decades,

there was an increase in the formation of trade integration in Africa and worldwide. Southern African Development Community (SADC) is one of the regional integrations formed in 2001 with 16 member countries in Southern Africa with the aim to strengthen regional socio-economic, political and security cooperation. There are enormous differences in size, the role of trade, and factor endowments among the SADC members. South Africa is the prominent member accounts almost 70% of the GDP in the region (Lewis, Robinson & Thierfelder, 2001).

SADC member states have identified the importance of trading among each other, where member states make tremendous effort of improving country's trade performance and economic growth. Currently, SADC focus on economic cooperation where trade liberalization process is emphasized, by opening markets in the region and reduce various trade restrictions including tariffs and non-tariff barriers on trade. SADC supports increasingly free trade among its member states as part of its agenda to eradicate poverty in Southern Africa. It also seeks to increase domestic production create business opportunity and higher regional imports and exports, access to cheaper inputs of consumer goods, greater employment opportunities, more foreign direct investments and joint ventures, and the creation of regional value chains.

In August 2008 SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) was established, following the implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade in 2000 which laid the foundation for its formation. The SADC Free Trade Area aimed at facilitating smooth and free flow of trade among member states by implementing the schedule of tariff phasing down. The SADC-Customs Union, was to be established by 2010 according to the SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), however this was not achieved due to delays on negotiation phases.

The positive effect of regional integration on trade expansion and consequently on economic growth has been pointed out in many studies with each country enjoying its individual benefits (Baldwin 2003). However, since the establishment of SADC in 1992, the economies of SADC countries have remained relatively small since most of the member states were trading with European and Asia countries meeting various trade restrictions that hinders their targeted export (Qualmann, 2000).

Tanzania is one of the establishing members of SADC where it enjoys the market access of its products at the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Free Trade Area. SADC Free

Trade Area enables not only the free flow of goods, the protocol catalyzed the improvement of quality product and their competitiveness to fetch the comparative advantage in the region. The study analyzed the comparative advantage of Tanzanian exports against its trading partners in the SADC Free Trade Area. The study employs Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) Index to measure the comparative advantage of various sectors engage in SADC region trade. This study will add on the existing literature on the regional integration. Apart from adding to existing literature on the role of regional integration on partner country trade performance, study provides useful policy considerations regarding the usefulness of other regional trade arrangements which Tanzania is member to.

This paper is organized in five sections. The first section has introduced the topic. The subsequent section presents the review of literature that overviews the trade theories and performance of Tanzania in regional integrations. Section three explains the methodology used while section four presents the data, empirical analysis and findings of the study. Section five present conclusions and policy recommendations.

## **2.0 Related Literature**

Regional economic integration has resulted to economic success to some of the regions and member states. Tanzania through its National Trade Policy (2003) had a key objective that enables to identify ways and means of navigating through a viable and steady path towards a competitive export-led growth in order to meet the goal of poverty eradication. Tanzania focuses its trade pattern with Western Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia. One of the ways that enable Tanzania to trade in Sub-Saharan Africa is through SADC Free Trade Area. These three regions account for almost 90 per cent of the country's exports and two-thirds of all imports (URT, 2017).

### **2.1 Theoretical Literature Review**

International trade is explained using different international trade theories. Comparative advantage theory by Ricardo (1817) suggests that the driving force behind international trade is not absolute but comparative advantage. That is, even if an autarky country has absolute advantage in all the goods, that is it can produce all the goods more efficiently than other countries, it can still benefit from international trade through increasing specialization in the goods where its comparative advantage lies (Leung & Cai, 2007). The study emphasized that the revealed comparative advantage theory stresses the importance of countries to focus on what they do best or produce

efficiently to maximize gains in international trade. The policy's response is that sectors in which a country does well must be supported by appropriate policies (Wangwe, 1995). This is to ensure that countries derive gains from those particular sectors and continue to establish dominance in producing and exporting goods produced in those sectors. However, the comparative advantage theory reflects differences in opportunity costs that countries face, which implies that countries can export those goods in which they have a comparative advantage and import those in which they have a comparative disadvantage. Since countries have comparative advantages in different goods, they benefit by engaging in trading with each other.

While Heckscher - Ohlin's theory explains that difference in factor endowments will create a basis for trade between two countries. Each country will export items whose production requires intensive use of the factors with which it is abundantly endowed relative to other nations. The theory argued that two countries that share the same general technology differ in their endowments of the basic factors of production. The difference in abundance of the factors of production between countries is the one that creates comparative advantage of the country. According to this theory, a country has to produce and export the products which use intensively the abundant factors in the country because the products which use intensively the abundant factors are the ones which a country have comparative advantage in trade. Therefore, this theory underscores the significance of exchanging commodities and transforming the local market into global one (Leamer, 1995).

## **2.2 Empirical Literature Review**

Various studies have explained the comparative advantage of country's export products and their destinations. Ndukwe (2004), argued that when countries focus on trade and investment, economic cooperation and regional integration they will create market opportunities to reap the gains from globalization. Most of African states are facing difficulty in expanding the market of their products, therefore economic cooperation and regional integration such as SADC have the potential to create an expanded and unified market needed, diversifying the economic base will increase the competitiveness not only in the regional integrations but also in the global market. Chen *et al.* (2017) analyzed through comparative advantage and export competitiveness of China's fruit products. The main objective was to consider the characteristics and the competitive strengths of China's fruit export and their influencing factors. The study adopted the RCA Index as the indicator of export competitiveness. It was found that among the seven species of the major exporting fruits in China, the RCA of pears and apples was larger than one. This shows that pears and apples

produced in China had a strong competitive advantage. The citrus and orange fruits had a weak competitive advantage. The RCA of bananas, grapes and peaches indicated weaker competitive advantages. The study recommended that strict technical and management standards of production and implementation of the brand strategy were important methods in addressing current issues such as fruit sales difficulties and the tendency of increasing production without increasing profits.

The study by Cassim (2001) used a Cross Section Econometric Gravity Model to look at the potential for trade among SADC countries. The study results showed that specific areas where potential trade was less than the actual trade were mostly South Africa and Zimbabwe. Specifically, for South Africa, the researcher found that in all instances, its potential exports were significantly low. On the other note, Elbadawi (1997), found results compatible with the pattern of intra-regional trade as reported by earlier studies. The findings revealed that SADC did not have a significant effect on trade among its members, although there was a slight improvement in the performance of the bloc. Another empirical literature on complementary trade and similarity between India and ASEAN was conducted by Chadran (2010), and it adopted the Trade Intensity Index (TII) and RCA Index. The study focused on determining whether the value of trade between the two countries was greater or smaller than would be expected on the basis of their importance in world trade. The findings of the study revealed that India's export and import intensity with ASEAN was above one for most of the years. This means India's exports and imports were more intense with ASEAN countries compared with its trading patterns with the rest of the world.

The study conducted on the RCA of Malaysia and China found out that the comparative advantages of Malaysia in high -technology products have been crumbling down over the years since the 1990s. On the other hand, China has begun to experience a comparative advantage in the export of skill intensive goods. Moreover, in the study of the Czech and other selected transitional economies' exports, Sevela (2003) noted that major changes have occurred regarding export competitiveness in high-tech goods and the efficiency of exports has increased henceforth since the political transformations of 1989. Different study findings such as Bojnec and Ferto (2016) on export competitiveness of the European Union in fruit and vegetable products in the global market have explained about the time factor and how it affects the export of fruits from the favourable climate with modern technology in agriculture. Regarding RCA of Malaysia and China, Sevela (2003) showed that major changes have occurred regarding export competitiveness in high-tech

goods and that the efficiency of exports has increased which gave high advantage to export products of pears and apples with unique large appearance and the study recommends branding strategies to the rest of the export products.

Further, Makochekanwa (2012) conducted a study to assess the impact of regional trade agreements on intra-trade in selected agro-food products in three regional integrations, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). All these study findings underline the benefits of regional integration and international trade as a whole.

In the course of revealing the less known roles of SADC Free Trade Area in ensuring market availability for Tanzania's goods, this study was supported by Comparative Advantage Theory where it shows that, Tanzania is trading the products that it produces at best in the SADC, this is also supported with what Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin's theory which argues that benefits of more export depend on country's factor endowment. This study was undertaken to further reveal out other factors which give Tanzania advantage to trade with SADC member states despite the above factors of integration between states.

### **3.0 Methodology**

This study adopted a descriptive research design to assess the relationship between Tanzania's exports and the SADC market. The understanding of the relationship between Tanzania's export and SADC market was used to analyze the relationship of Tanzania's exports and SADC countries. The study analyzed the revealed comparative advantage of Tanzania's exports within SADC member states using secondary data. The study selected products that had been traded and identified at World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) with the product categories from Tanzania to SADC countries. In the course of deriving the study findings, data obtained from the Central Bank of Tanzania, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and International Trade Centre (ITC) for the most traded product categories in the SADC region from 2008 up to 2018 were used. Consequently, RCA indices were calculated for Tanzania and SADC member countries from 2008 to 2018. The fact that the pattern of comparative advantage differs across different countries exports, the index of RCA (RCAI) is calculated using data on exports flow from Tanzania to SADC member states from World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) that measures export performance.

### 3.1 Data Processing and Analysis

The RCA index was used to determine each advantage of Tanzania's product group exported to SADC member states. The RCA is used in international economics to calculate the relative advantage or disadvantage of a certain country in a certain class of goods or services. The study used data for 15 products groups for the 15 SADC member states.

### 3.2 RCA Model Specification

The study adopted the Balassa's Model (1965) that explains the international trade between countries. The Balassa index measures normalized export shares, with respect to the exports of the same industry in a group of reference countries. In the literature, numerous empirical studies have used the Balassa index to identify a country's strong sectors (Utkulu & Seymen, 2004). The collected data were systematically sorted, filtered and analyzed through inserting into MS-Excel, the formula:

$$RCA = \frac{X_{ij}/X_{it}}{X_{wj}/X_{wt}}$$

Where;

$X_{ij}$  is country  $i$ 's exports of commodity  $j$ ,

$X_{it}$  is country  $i$ 's total exports,

$X_{wj}$  is trading partner's exports of commodity  $j$ ,

$X_{wt}$  is trading partners' total exports.

In this case, the model is useful in identifying the commodities which have a comparative advantage over the trading partner commodities. The interpretation of the model is that: if the calculated value is greater than 1 in any commodity category, the share of that product in a country's exports is more than the trading partner's share and hence it has a comparative advantage in that particular product. When the calculated value is less than 1, the share of that product in a country's exports is less than the trading partner's share.

### 4.0 Results and Discussion

This section presents the study results drawn from the secondary data obtained from different sources formulated from the World Integrated Trade Solution. The study analyzed the data through the Revealed Comparative Advantage index in order to observe the most highly exported products

from Tanzania to SADC countries. The table below illustrates the performing products that were highly exported into SADC countries from 2008 up 2018.

**Table 1: The RCA for Selected 15 Product Categories From 2008-2018 between Tanzania and SADC Member States**

Countries	Products categories with average RCA														
	Capital Good	Consumer Goods	Intermediate Goods	Raw Material	Animal	Food Product	Footwear	Hide and skin	Metals	Mineral	Plastic or rubber	Stone And glass	Textile and cloth	Vegetable	Wood
<i>Angola</i>	1.6	0.6	1.6	0.6	0.0	1.0	0.8	0.1	1.1	N/A	1.3	1.2	2.6	1.2	3.9
<i>Botswana</i>	2.9	0.6	0.3	0.4	3	1.7	4	5.9	0.7		0.8	0.0	1.6	0.5	0.2
<i>Comoros</i>	0.6	1.2	0.8	2	0.5	0.7	2.5	4.5	0.5	0.9	2.6	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.9
<i>DRC</i>	0.0	1	1.8	1.6	0.0	6.3	0.5	0.7	0.1	5.2	0.1	8	0.3	0.6	0.1
<i>Eswatini</i>	0.6	1.2	1	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.4	1	0.8	N/A	5.5	0.0	6.2	0.0	0.2
<i>Lesotho</i>	N/A	1.6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.8	N/A	N/A
<i>Madagascar</i>	0.2	0.8	0.1	13	N/A	1.5	0.0	5.5	0.1	0	0.2	42	1.6	0.01	0.0
<i>Malawi</i>	0.3	0.8	1.6	1.6	9	1.5	0.7	0.8	0.8	5.6	0.3	3.7	3	0.3	0.4
<i>Mauritius</i>	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.0	N/A	0.0	8.6	7.7	0.3	0.2
<i>Mozambique</i>	0.7	1	1.7	0.6	0.1	4.0	0.9	0.4	0.3	0.7	1.6	0.8	16.3	0.2	0.6
<i>Namibia</i>	1.6	1.1	0.5	0.5	N/A	N/A	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.0	1.6	1	0.2
<i>Seychelles</i>	1.4	0.8	3.3	2.9	0.8	1.1	N/A	N/A	0.1	N/A	7.1	0.4	5.2	5	8.9
<i>South Africa</i>	0.3	1.9	0.7	1.3	0.4	2.8	0.7	0.3	0.8	0.2	0.15	3.3	4.4	8.2	0.0
<i>Zambia</i>	0.3	1.5	1.9	1.1	2.3	0.4	0.3	0.0	1.6	0.5	0.9	2.3	6	1.6	0.5
<i>Zimbabwe</i>	0.8	1.2	0.5	2.4	1.9	2.3	14	3.3	0.1	0.1	1.5	8.8	16.8	16.8	0.3

**Source: Research data, (2020)**

Key for the table 1 above:

- $RCA > 1$  = Comparative advantage
- $RCA < 1$  = Comparative disadvantage
- N/A = Data was not found

#### 4.1 Discussion

The calculations of the RCA index were carried out by 15 product categories. The study findings presented in Table 1 above entail RCAs from 15 product categories considering the export destinations to each SADC member state. The 15 product categories considered under this study include capital goods, consumer goods, intermediate goods, raw materials, animals, food products, footwear, hide and skin, metal, minerals, plastic or rubber, stone and glass textile and cloth, vegetable and wood. The computed index of RCA greater than one indicates that Tanzania enjoys comparative advantage to different product in SADC market and for the RCA less than one indicates the comparative disadvantage. The findings show that the Revealed Comparative Advantage more than 1 suggesting that Tanzania enjoys comparative advantage of the product category, this shows on product category like vegetable to country like Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa, Seychelles and Angola, the above advantage resulted from the strong commitment of the government to agriculture category as a priority sector in export strategy and Kilimo Kwanza, it has been as a stepping stone to transform the sector into one of the main sources of income to farmers and foreign exchange earner. (Horticultural Development Council of Tanzania report, 2010).

Tanzania also enjoys positive comparative advantage in textile and cloth product category, for the positive RCA study found competitive factor being the world's largest producers of organic cotton, remarkable social and political stability, an ecological, clean and socially compliant textile and clothing industry and good transport infrastructure affirm to such an advantage. Tanzania has also caught the eye of foreign investors and several Tanzanian companies have ambitious growth projects. Together with the receiving state factors that provides Tanzania positive RCA to countries like Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa, Seychelles, Namibia, Mozambique, Mauritius, Malawi, Madagascar, Eswatini, Botswana and Angola in Textile and cloth product category.

Tanzania's Mineral policy (2009) continue to attract investment in exploration and mining, emphasize integration of the mineral sector with the rest of the economy, establish a fiscal regime which ensures benefits to the country and remain internationally competitive, support mineral beneficiation and marketing; underpin development of small-scale miners and promote public participation in mining activities. This policy provides a clear guidance to investors towards sustainable exploitation of mineral resources of Tanzania in a win – win manner, those policy efforts support the study findings in table 1, in that regards Tanzania was able to reveal the positive RCA to countries like Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi for the mineral categories and positive RCA for Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe for stone and glass categories.

Reflection in political and economic relations with neighboring countries, in particular to member states with RCA more than one has continued to give Tanzania export surplus over various products thus provide the comparative advantage to Tanzania's exports to those products. The findings show also that the advantage has been due to the strategic position of the United Republic of Tanzania where it serves some of land - locked SADC member states, the unique resource endowments in the country such as favourable climate, land mass and abundances of natural resources provide to the advantage of Tanzania's trade exports despitesharing same general technology with other SADC member state.

Increase in export through the establishment of Export Processing Zone (EPZ) aimed at promoting rapid economic growth by using fiscal and business incentives to attract investments and technology. In 2002, Tanzania established its Export Processing Zones (EPZ) scheme to provide for the establishment of export-oriented investments within the designated zones with the views of creating international competitiveness for export - led economic growth. Tanzania's EPZs promote exports of products that use local materials such as textiles and garments, leather goods, agro-processing and the lapidary industry. In addition, in 2006 the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) introduced promoted a quick and significant progress in economic growth, export earnings and employment creation. SEZ also attracted the private investment in the form of both Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and Domestic Direct Investment (DDI) from all productive and service sectors whose products were as well exported to SADC market.

According to the 2017/18 Bank of Tanzania (BOT)'s Annual Report, Tanzania was the fastest growing economy in SADC with a GDP growth of 7.1%. Tanzania's total intra-SADC trade however, declined by 3.5 percent in 2017 as compared to 2016 due to fall in both exports and imports. Nevertheless, Tanzania continued to be a net-exporter to other SADC countries, recording a trade surplus of USD 445.5 million in 2017 up from USD 397.2 million in 2016. Tanzania generally recorded a trade surplus with South Africa, DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola and Botswana. Meanwhile Tanzania recorded a trade deficit with Zambia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Swaziland, Seychelles and Lesotho although  $RCA > 1$  has been shown to some of these SADC member states.

The above surplus and deficit as supported by study findings shown from table 1 to member state with the RCA more than 1 for most of the products thus indicated country's export surplus, defines that Tanzania enjoys comparative advantage over the products and comparative disadvantage to products with the RCA less than 1 to countries with the trade deficit.

The observations show large fluctuations over the years with the RCA index for the product group year 2008 to year 2018 in which different product groups have different ranges of variation which may be due to various factors. The result for  $RCA < 1$  from this study does not mean that Tanzania did not export to SADC member countries for product category like capital goods, consumer goods, footwear, wood, and food products. Further, according to the 2017/18 Bank of Tanzania (BOT)'s Annual Report, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) remain a challenge to some of the SADC member states, lack of harmonization of sanitary and phytosanitary measures for agriculture and livestock, as well as custom delays including processing export/transit permits are among the impediments. Chauvin and Gaulier (2012) argued that different economies of scale among SADC member states give the variation in enjoying the comparative advantage of their products. Other associated factors are different in Gross Domestic Product of member states which have positive relationship with the export volume since increase in production lead to surplus, terms of trade, foreign direct investment, transport cost, exchange rate and inflation rate are other facilitative factors that affect meeting a large portion of SADC's exports needs.

Also, study findings revealed the comparative disadvantage of some product categories for some of the SADC member states resulted from unreported data to World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) for some years. Unavailability of data for some years or over a period of ten years to

some products resulted and affected the average RCA of some product categories indicated that Tanzania has comparative disadvantage of some product categories to the respective SADC member states hypothesis that may be not applicable.

Despite the SADC big market, goods originating from the partner states have to meet the rules of origin criteria, wholly produced in SADC member state or have undergone sufficient working or process in a SADC member state using non-originating materials. To take full advantage on the second criteria Tanzania will need to increase value addition to its products through industrialization strategy. Tanzania can further leverage on its membership to SADC to achieve further economic growth.

## **5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations**

### **5.1 Conclusion**

Studies indicated that trade flows in most African countries have been minimal due to small economic size, trade barriers, border delays, lack of adequate infrastructure, poor condition of the roads, lack of integration into value chains, too many and high costs of road tolls for the use of roadways (ADB, 2000; UNCTAD, 2009). More importantly, Chauvin and Gaulier (2002) clarified that a low degree of complementarities among SADC economies is among the critical reasons for low trade flows within SADC member states. Most SADC member states have similar export profiles, based mainly on primary commodities, which limit the potential growth of trade within the region.

The objectives of regional integration are to reduce trade barriers in order to promote and boost trade among member states. However, a small share of exports and imports within the SADC region depicts a slow improvement in trade among member states. Therefore, most of SADC member states appear to trade more with other countries outside the SADC region. Within the region for the success export performance, national policies should simultaneously address the twin issues of intra-regional market (in this case within SADC member states) and other foreign markets. Fighting for better access to other international markets without simultaneously paying attention to improve regional market is likely to weaken the intra-SADC trade.

### **5.2 Recommendations**

Basing on the study findings, numerous recommendations are posed herein for SADC member countries to continue reaping fruits of integration through diversification of comparative advantages in the region, such that each member state needs to exploit the available opportunities. The current situation where most members of the region exports/imports match to/from South Africa only reflects limited trade linkages among other SADC member states. The small share of exports and imports reveals that SADC member states need to move into the production of those products which have a Revealed Comparative Advantage in order to ensure expansion of the regional market. Since this phenomenon was observed consistently to almost all SADC member states, it is recommended that the role of the export-oriented strategy and country specific policy should be emphasized in the region to promote infant export-oriented manufacturing industries of value addition products and support domestic industries to increase the production of processed products by countries stimulating financial assistance. Infrastructure development for the United Republic of Tanzania and the entire region will continue to support the export performance within the region.

Furthermore, SADC member states may require taking initiatives with attention on focusing to each member state's status due to the observed mixed impact of macroeconomic variables on exports in the region. However, general observation indicates that it is of critical importance to maintain a high and sustainable economic growth. Evidence has shown that effort to promote GDP tends to promote export performance in most SADC member states. Therefore, Tanzania financial sector should focus on creating the necessary conditions in which growth and development can prosper. To achieve this, central banks need to maintain the two overriding principles, protect the value of the national currency and preserve the overall financial stability. Creating a stable macroeconomic environment promotes savings necessary to finance investments leading to export performance. Tanzania economic policies should focus on giving economic benefits to exporters in order to enjoy the unique factor endowment present in the country.

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**The Traditional Methods of Conflict Transformation in Africa: The Case of Gacaca Courts in Rwanda**

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***Abstract***

*The study was conducted to assess effectiveness of traditional methods in conflict transformation in Africa. This came as a response to the need for African solutions to African problems. The study analysed the Gacaca courts in Rwanda aiming at establishing the link between the traditional methods of conflict transformation and the modern ones which include the use of formal courts and international tribunals among others. The main objective of this study was to highlight factors which pushed the establishment of the Gacaca courts in Rwanda. The other objective was to examine the role of the Gacaca courts and evaluate the weaknesses of the Gacaca courts in the whole process of conflict transformation. This study is important because it puts more emphasis on traditional ways of transforming conflicts which would result into the building of peace and harmony within the framework of an African perspective. The study employed desk review as a secondary data collection method. Findings suggest that the courts helped to punish directly the perpetrators of the genocide and to a great extent eliminated retaliation. The courts served as a healing mechanism from the grassroots balancing justice, truth, love and peace. The study concluded that the traditional methods of conflict transformation help to build sustainable peace in the society. The study recommends that there is a need for diversifying different mechanisms of the similar type to deal with African problems.*

***Keywords:*** *conflict transformation, peace building, reconciliation*

**1.0 Introduction**

The Republic of Rwanda has a remarkable history following its terrible genocide in human history, which occurred in 1994. It is estimated that between 800,000 and 1,000,000 people were

killed during this catastrophe, the majority being the Tutsi and moderate Hutu (Staub *et al.*, 2005). The peace accord signed in Arusha in 1993, which aimed at power sharing between the Hutu-led government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) composed of the Tutsi refugees who fled to Uganda following their unlawful treatment by the Hutu in Rwanda. The accord was a sign of retreat by the conservative Hutu mainly the *Akazu* and *Impuzamugambi* wings. The signing of this accord was perceived as an act of abiding to the enemy's demands (Hauschild, 2012). Prior to this accord there was a long term ongoing civil war which began in 1990 and continued until the signing of the accord. The violence erupted from April 7<sup>th</sup> to July 15<sup>th</sup> 1994 after the plane which had carried the then President of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down by a missile from an 'unrecognized' launcher. The genocide started immediately after the crushing of the presidential plane and the next day the Prime Minister's residence was surrounded by the military forces resulting to killing Madam Prime Minister and the United Nations' peacekeepers safe-guarding the house. The conflict made ethnic identity crucial when the militia erected checkpoints and barricades and used Rwandans' national identity cards to systematically verify their ethnicity and kill the Tutsi. The violence involved the two major ethnic groups in Rwanda, the majority Hutu who felt undermined and exploited by the minority Tutsi who regarded themselves as an elite class and the ones deserving power. This violence existed for 100 days and Rwanda lost almost 20% of its population where 70% of deaths were the minority Tutsi (Amnesty International, 2004).

Unfortunately, the international community stepped aside during the genocide and the United Nations kept on watching on the matter without intervening. Intervention was needed immediately in Rwanda but the question remains why UN or Belgium as the former colonial power did not send any force to handle the situation. It is said that the international community can intervene in one community and not the other as it did to East Timor ethnocide or NATO intervention in Kosovo and not in Bosnia between 1991-1995 (Rioux & Boucher, 2003). The same international community chipped in immediately after the conflicts to try bringing to justice the perpetrators of the conflict of which, they were silent about from the beginning, (Siphamandla, 2017). In Rwanda the machetes were the major weapons used to carry out the killings and they were more preferable than the bullets since the Hutu aimed at wiping away the Tutsi ethnic group in cold blood.

Until the end of genocide at least 250,000 women were victims of sexual violence, many were killed and 70% of the survivors were infected with HIV (Amnesty International, 2004). The survivors of the genocide including the perpetrators and victims continued to live together within the society after the management of violence. This situation, therefore, underlined the need for reconciliation strategies to prevent the possibility for future violence. Some scholars argued that the basic human emotional needs of justice, empowerment, security and recognition were important for the Rwandan society to move forward from the genocide (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Defining ethnicity, Hauschild (2012) quoted Eltringham (2004) saying it is a polythetic concept that refers to several attributes which include the name of a group, a distinctive language, religion, geographic territory, values and norms and history. Ethnicity was the major problem in the Rwandan genocide as people distinguished themselves 'us' from 'them'. The Rwandan population is made of three ethnic groups, the Hutus comprising (85%), Tutsis (14%) and the Twa making only (1%), (Hauschildt, 2012).

Since war begins in the minds of men, similarly, in the minds of men defenses of peace must be constructed (Flores, 2006). The need to build peace through conflict transformation is a question of no objection. The people of Rwanda have witnessed the tremendous actions of their fellow citizens which left the untold sorrows to mankind. Using formal judicial systems to punish the perpetrators of the conflict is important but the question remains as to what should be done to address the post conflict trauma that has lived with the survivors of the genocide. This study therefore, aimed at assessing the relevance of the African traditional methods of conflict transformation using the *Gacaca* courts system as a case study.

The purpose of this study was to assess the relevance of the establishment of the *Gacaca* courts in Rwanda. It was also sought to examine the role of the *Gacaca* court in bringing justice to the grassroots and to identify the challenges of the *Gacaca* courts in the whole process of conflict transformation in an African context.

This study adopted a desk research design whereby the researcher collected secondary data including the review of books, journal articles and documentary reviews. It also included the audio and video visual reviews on the Rwanda genocide. Data analysis was done by using both qualitative and quantitative techniques.

## 2.0 Theoretical Underpinning

Djurdjevic-Lukic (2014) explained the foundation of the theory of change which focuses on the need for the society to change its behaviour and adopt a positive interaction among them so as to prevent all the possibilities of quarrels in the future. This theory proposes that the establishment of state-community security models at the grassroots level is an important aspect in ensuring that citizens are included in peace building processes and enhance cooperation among them. Changing of behaviour among the people of Rwanda through traditional methods in conflict transformation would help in building a future peaceful society as suggested by Djurdjevic – Lukic (2014).

## 3.0 Results and Discussion

### 3.1 Factors behind the establishment of *Gacaca* courts in Rwanda

After the genocide both the Hutu and Tutsi continued to have grievances hence the possibility of revenge was sensed. To address that possibility there were thousands of accused persons still awaiting trial in the national court system. In order to bring justice and reconciliation at the grassroot level, the Rwandan Government re-established the traditional community court system in 2002. These grassroot institutions would assist the International Court Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) to deal with the post-genocide cases. The Rwandan Government made use of its own domestic judicial system as found necessary for the cases and introduced at a later stage, the traditional *Gacaca* courts. This term *Gacaca* means justice to the grass roots (Mutisi, 2009). The Government established about 120,000 courts across the country which judged 1.2 million cases in the whole country using the cultural approaches for reconciliation. The Organic Law 40/2000 (*Gacaca* Law) passed on January 26, 2001, clearly indicated the Government's intent to go forward with establishing *Gacaca* jurisdictions throughout the country to try crimes associated with the 1994 genocide. The law was enacted in 2001 to give the *Gacaca* legal mandate in the genocide cases in which the official launch of the system took place in June 2002. Each *Gacaca* court had a panel with nineteen judges traditionally termed as *Inyangamugayo* meaning persons with good conduct. The *Inyangamugayos* were elected on the basis of possessing qualities including courage, honor, justice, truth and high moral/ethical standards. The *Inyangamugayos* received no salaries but their families were granted free education and medical care.

To hold a court required a total of 15 judges and 100 witnesses with the community members (Mutisi, 2009). According to the Government of Rwanda Organic Law Number 16/2004, the perpetrators were divided into three categories. Category one involved planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of higher authority like those in the army or police force. This category dealt with murderers who committed crimes with extraordinary brutality and persons who committed acts of torture and raping and other acts which did not lead to deaths of the victims. Within the same category people who committed degrading acts on dead bodies were also added. Category two dealt with the perpetrators who deliberately caused homicide or serious attacks causing deaths and persons who intended to cause deaths but ended up causing injuries. Category three dealt with persons who committed theft and destruction of property during the genocide (Hauschildt, 2012). The *Gacaca* courts were given power to handle category two and three while the ICTR had the mandate under UNSC Resolution 955, 1994 & 977, 1995 to deal with the cases of category one (Government of Rwanda, 1996).

### **3.2 *Gacaca* procedures**

According to traditions of Rwanda, when a dispute has been resolved, a ritual ceremony will be held to reflect the symbolic and practical importance of the process. The meals eaten during a session of the court bring together the rivalry parties and show their passion, hence provide a way to reconciliation. The process involves local residents testifying for or against the suspects who were accused to have committed crimes within the communities they were dwelling. The individuals tried in the *Gacaca* courts were typically prisoners prepared to confess before their societies for their great crimes during genocide and their involvement hence willing to engage in community adjudication (Mutisi, 2009). The courts could sentence anyone confirmed to have committed crimes during the genocide though their powers were limited to more serious cases involving organizing and executing genocide – related atrocities. The courts were also restricted to provide death penalties or try an army officer.

The courts aimed at healing from psychological wounds created by the past victimization and make it less likely that victims were engaging in unnecessary defensive violence (Staub *et al.*, 2005). In reducing pain and suffering, healing makes reconciliation possible and with peace

agreement the disputes among ethnic groups can be managed. However, it has been experienced that the re-emergence of more violence is likely to happen even after these agreements. Peace agreement does not by itself change feelings of enmity, fear, mistrust and hostility—that have developed out of the conflict but it needs changes in attitudes between the conflicting parties. The courts aimed at teaching children too on the evils which the existing generation has committed and the importance of taking care of all people irrespective of their different identities within the community. Straub et al. (2003, p.6) pointed out on the meaning of reconciliation for the growing population as he explained:

To care about people we need to feel cared about. Children who experience love, affection and positive guidance will feel good about themselves, see the world as benevolent and will value other people. However, children who experience neglect, rejection, hostility and bad treatment cannot simply be instructed to care about people. Their experiences will create fear and mistrust of people.

### **3.3 The role of *Gacaca* courts in bringing justice to the grassroots**

The *Gacaca* courts brought together the hostile groups which sat to discuss the mistakes they had. The trials promoted reconciliation by providing a means for the victims to learn the truth about the deaths of their family members, friends and relatives. They also allowed perpetrators to confess their crimes, show remorse and ask for forgiveness in front of their community members. These criminals were further given low sentences upon giving fully confession on their involvement (Brounéus, 2008). Through the principle of truth telling, witnesses and perpetrators had to give detailed information including how and where the crimes were carried out, confirm the victims and if possible show where the victim bodies were left (Mutisi, 2009).

The courts have addressed the question of identity in Rwanda, balancing justice, truth, peace and security. Identity has been a matter of concern to the constitution of Rwanda which shows that all people share equal rights and that the country through its constitution will fight discrimination and divisive genocide ideology (UN Report, 2002). Data shows that the judicial system of Rwanda had 785 judges before genocide most of them being Tutsi but after the massacre only 20 survived hence *Gacaca* were inevitable in addressing justice in the country. With the larger


number of suspects to be put to trial it was estimated that it would take up 150 years for all cases to be processed under the normal judicial system (Houschildt, 2012). The *Gacaca* system has shown the role of cultural values within the communities mostly in post - conflict resolutions. The system highlights the ability of Rwanda to settle its problems through an indigenous judicial structure. Mutisi (2009) in this view added that, the *Gacaca* gives people a chance to talk about genocide and that the people feel the sense of togetherness and being involved in resolving their problems.

The discriminatory ideologies such as “Hutu Power” meaning the world without the Tutsi are a better world for Hutus. Such ideologies were no longer used to distinguish the Hutu from Tutsi. Instead, it was raised that no single ethnic group would claim to have more power than the other. (Staub *et al.*, 2005). If painful and terrible memories about the past were not clearly and strongly dealt with by one generation they would spoil the forthcoming generations with cycles of violence and counter violence (Volcan, 2000). Volcan is quoted by Mutisi (2009, p. 21) arguing that “the *Gacaca* play a vital role in preventing the Trans - generational transmission of trauma in Rwanda through public gathering and for that case the courts contribute towards efforts to prevent cultural revengeful thoughts to future generations”.

The apology aspect within the *Gacaca* courts procedures provides with it a special form which makes the internal healing a point of great concern. Upon disclosing their information before the community, perpetrators were given a chance to apologize for their crimes. The perpetrators reintegration into the community contributes to the mending of broken relationships and improving victims’ lives (Mutisi, 2009).

Looking on the Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer (RRB), the *Gacaca* system encourages people with different identities to work together as witnesses, tribunal personnel and jurors aiming at reaching a mutual and satisfactory judgment. The barometer shows how people were now viewing themselves as Rwandese by identity rather than being classified according to their ethnic lines (Government of Rwanda, 2010).

### **Figure 3.1: Rwandese Ethnic Identity Preference after Genocide**



**Figure 1.** *Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer, 2010*

From Figure 1 presents the findings of the study by Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer (2010) of the preference of Rwandese ethnic identity after genocide. About 70.8% of the respondents strongly agree that they want their children to consider themselves Rwandans than Hutu, Twa or Tutsi. Also, about 63.6% of the respondents strongly agree that it is more important to identify oneself as Rwandan, than any form of identity. While it is only less than 1% of the respondents disagree on the above research question. The historical challenge of the genocide and the fear of the nation to be divided into ethnic groups, majority refused to be identified as Hutu or Tutsi but as people of the one united Rwanda.

### 3.4 Challenges of the *Gacaca* courts in the process of conflict transformation

The courts were claimed by observers to be a means by which the Government of Rwanda led by the Tutsi intended to punish the Hutu in a legal manner. The Tutsi were criticized for being

biased since the courts seemed to focus on crimes committed by the Hutu against the Tutsi. Moreover, it was alleged that the courts did not deal with the crimes committed by RPF forces during and after the ending of the genocide (Mutisi, 2009). The force was claimed by the Amnesty International to have committed crimes against humanity which among many included raping, torture and recruitment of child soldiers. The sentences provided to the perpetrators were stipulated in the law showing that, individuals falling under category one were liable to death penalty, those falling under category two were also liable to death penalty too but favoured by receiving life imprisonment while others being sentenced for seven years or above in prison. The others under category three were liable to a penalty equivalent to one half of the penalty the Tribunal would normally impose (Organic Law, 1996).

Telling the truth does not lead to successful reconciliation at all times since sometimes it can lead to reprisals against those who practice it (Hamber, 2007). Telling the truth is more complex in the aspect of reconciliation strategy because sometimes it triggers past memories which can lead to further breaching of peace (Lerche, 2000). The victims were not provided with psychological help and their security was not guaranteed after the court sessions. Victims of the genocide were largely viewed as Tutsi survivors and the courts seemed to be imposing victors 'justice' (Mamdani, 2000).

Besides, the courts seemed gender biased since the majority of women were not included in judgment. The patriarchal nature of the *Gacaca* system was in one way viewed as an organ not representing the women cases particularly those involving matters related to rape and assaults on rape and assaults. A woman claiming to have been raped was quoted saying: "When I gave my testimony, I had a psychological crisis ... When you give a testimony surrounded by people who have killed your family ... you feel ill; you feel insane..." (Hauschild, 2012). Such cases lack direct proofs, thus making it imperative to rely on eyewitnessing, which makes it hard for most women to step forward and testify (Conley & O'Barr, 2005). There is lack of suitable mechanism at the courts to guarantee the safety of the witnesses thus limiting the information collected. The court has only one law which allows it to sentence an individual up to three years in prison to whoever refusing to testify of anyone giving false testimony ( Mutisi, 2009).

Reconciliation is a stepping stone towards ending any conflict which touches the identity of parties (Siphamandla, 2017). Reconciliation through *Gacaca* courts helped to reduce ethnic tensions among the people under hostile relations at first but now people have decided to work together in building the new Rwanda. Research shows the level of inter-ethnic cooperation has increased and the willingness to support each other even from the opposition side has been a matter of concern.

#### **4.0 Conclusion**

Many people who were victimized during the conflict became violent. Reading and telling the children about the past will help them to some extent understand their environment and master it (Staub et al., 2003). Staub added that:

Ceremonies and commemorations can also help healing from the past experience and reconnecting with other people. However, they have to be carefully devised, so that rather than reopening wounds and accentuating feelings of insecurity, they point to a more hopeful future (p. 800).

This may be followed by children actually talking about their experiences, while receiving empathetic and loving support. People who guide the children or adults on that processes do not require professional knowledge but only some trainings and wisdom on handling matters.

The *Gacaca* courts have paved a way towards African ways of handling their domestic matters with the mechanisms designed by themselves. The courts were officially closed in June 2012 having functioned in the whole state and assisted the Rwanda's judicial system and the ICTR in cases related to the genocide.

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Malisa (2004) further stressed that it is evident...

*When directly quoting from a source, you must include page number(s) and enclose the quote in double quotation marks.*

Example: “A woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction” (Woolf, 1929, p. 6).

Note: For multiple pages, use the abbreviation ‘pp.’ Include the full-page range, i.e. ‘64-67’.

Example: Woolf (1929, pp. 64-67) observes that...

*The following are examples of citing from two authors: Cite both names each time the reference appears in the text. Do not use et al.*

Emmanuel and Rose (2008) further stressed that it is evident...

*Authors and year in parenthesis, use the symbol ‘&’ to separate the authors, followed by comma to separate the year.*

...livestock keepers and crop farmers (Ismaeel & Ahmed, 2009).

*The following are examples of citing from three and more authors:*

Cite all the name of the authors the first time you cite.

Kimaro, Joseph and Moureen (2006) pointed out that...

*Cite the same three and more authors within the same paragraph. In this situation, cite the first author followed by et al. and exclude the year.*

Kimaro, Joseph, and Moureen (2006) pointed out ... Kimaro et al. also...

*Cite the same three and more authors in subsequent paragraphs. In this case, cite the first author, et al., and include the year of publication.*

Kimaro et al. (2006) discovered...

### **Some example of Chicago footnotes/endnotes style;**

In Chicago style, footnotes or endnotes are used to reference pieces of work in the text.

To cite from a source a superscript number is placed after a quote or a paraphrase.

Citation numbers should appear in sequential order.

If using endnotes, numbered notes will appear on a separate, endnotes page at the end of your document and before the bibliography page. The page should be titled Notes (centered at top).

Footnotes must appear at the bottom of the page that they are referred to.

### **Example**

Political advisors were confident in their point-lead<sup>1</sup>.

### **Foot/Endnote**

1. Newton Minow and Craig LaMay, *Inside the Presidential Debates: Their Improbable Past and Promising Future*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 24-25.

Footnotes/Endnotes are paired together with a bibliography at the end of the research publication.

## **B. Some Common Referencing Formats**

### **Journal Article:**

Guion, R.M. (1973). A note on organizational climate. *Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance*, 9(1), 120 – 125.

### **Book:**

Schein, E.H. (1980). *Organizational psychology* (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

### **Article or Chapter in Book:**

Guion, R.M. (1991). Personnel assessment, selection, and replacement. In M.D. Dunnet & L.M. Hough (Eds.), *Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology* (pp. 327 - 397). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

### **Dissertation or Thesis:**

Mauer, K.F. (1976). *The assessment of human resources utilization*. Unpublished D Com Thesis. Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg.

### **From the Internet:**

United Nations. (2002). *New marketing strategies* [online]. Available at: <http://www.admar.com/marketing2001/> (Accessed 10 December 2002).

### **Book Reviews**

The IDR Journal also invites books reviews. The reviewed book shall not be more than six months (for an online published) and one year (for a normal book) since the date of publication.

Relevant books are scholarly monographs and collections that fit within the scope of the journal. Please note that IDR journal does not, except in very rare cases, review autobiographies, memoirs, fiction, reference books, reprints, or revised editions.

A book review should evaluate the arguments of a book rather than repeat information readily available online. In other words, it should *not* be a chapter-by-chapter summary of a text, but rather a critical discussion of its theses, structure, and style that places the text within the context of scholarly literature. IDR journal wants to hear your opinion, and expects reviews to be well written, lively, and engaging. The length of the review shall be 15 -20 pages.

*The book review must contain the publication and reviewer data above the main text, using this format:*

Full name, ***The Title of the Book***, Series Title (Place of Publication: Publisher, Date of Publication).

Reviewed by; Full name, Affiliation Institution and email address.

